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ABSTRACT: 
 
This study deals with the corruption situation in China and Singapore. Corruption is a serious issue not 
only occurs in the underdeveloped countries but also the developing and developed countries. The reality 
is that the majority of the countries suffer from corruption and problems it causes. As neighboring 
countries, China and Singapore performed very differently on the matter of curbing corruption. Singapore 
has one of the cleanest governments in the world while China is suffering from the problems caused by 
corruption. 
China has been studying and drawing lessons from Singapore for over 30 years. However, the results are 
not quite what people had expected. The Singaporean example in curbing corruption seems ineffective 
when applied in China. By comparing the anti–corruption measures in China and Singapore, I explain the 
reasons why the adopted policies in China failed to function as effectively as in Singapore in order to 
shed some light on the issue of how to make anti–corruption policy that actually works in China.  
The idea of thinking that by simply copying the Singaporean experiences, China could tackle the 
problems as well as Singapore has, is naïve and unrealistic. The problem that the anti–corruption measure 
is ineffective in China is because there is no matching environment for it to grow. In order to solve the 
problem, systemic, structural, and policy changes must be initiated beforehand to build the foundation for 
an effective anti–corruption policy in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Corruption, anti−corruption, China, Singapore, changes 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Corruption is a universal issue all over the world. It is also an important issue for 
authorities in every country. Today, corruption exists not only in the underdeveloped 
countries but also in the developing and developed countries as well. As a country that 
has the world‘s fastest economic growth, China belongs to the category of developing 
counties where the corruption situation is relatively severe compared to the developed 
countries. Knowing the situation at home, China never stopped the struggle of fighting 
corruption. However, due to its unique social, economical and administrative systems, it 
is destined that China cannot fight against corruption simply by copying other 
developed countries‘ successful anti–corruption measures and theories and most of 
these examples and experiences are not even suitable for China to learn from. 
Singapore, on the other hand, shares a lot of commonalities with China, and the fact that 
the Singaporean government is one of the cleanest governments in the world makes it 
not only possible but also conductible for China to study its triumphant anti−corruption 
examples and experiences.  
 
The thing is that after studying the example of Singapore for over 30 years, China had 
borrowed one of the distinguished experiences–the world famous Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to build its anti−corruption agency, the result, however, is 
not as desirable as people expected. The purpose of this thesis is try to understand the 
essence of the Singaporean experience and the reason why it appears to be less helpful 
as expected as well as the truth of the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean 
government that has become popular in China for years and the consideration of how to 
apply it and what could be the obstacles if China chose to adopt it. 
 
Corruption originally comes from the Latin word corruptus which means to destroy 
(Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a). According to the Oxford Dictionary, corruption 
is defined as the destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or 
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favor; the use or existence of corrupt practices, in a state, public corporation etc. it is 
also defined as the activity of giving, promising or offering wrongful satisfaction or 
compensation, misuse of public power and so on. Mostly the reason that the corruption 
happens with public servants is that they try to fulfill their own interests, and benefit 
from the power that people have given them. The detailed introduction as well as other 
definitions of corruption that have been used commonly around the world are given in 
Chapter 2.  
 
The common forms of corruption involve bribery, embezzlement, fraud, abuse of 
power, receiving an unlawful gratuity, favor or illegal commission, favoritism, nepotism 
and so on. Definitions and examples of these different forms of corruption are given in 
Chapter 2 as well. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
 
As to the causes of corruption, there are some theories such as 1. Cultural reasons like 
the existence of a gift culture, particularly in Africa, in which it is tradition that a small 
reward is paid for services rendered. Such a gratuity or tip becomes part of the cultural 
environment and in certain countries the payment of such rewards is so embedded in 
tradition that any attempt to rein in the practice would be seen as an attack on treasured 
cultural values. 2. The absence of rules, regulations, policies and legislation. All 
organizations, whether public or private, must have rules, regulations and policies that 
guide management and other employees in terms of acceptable behavior and conduct 
within the organization. Rules, regulations and policies are instrumental in organizing 
people, steering them towards a common goal and ensuring that everyone is treated 
fairly and equally. 3. Range of discretion. No system can exist unless one person or 
authority exists to make decisions. Such a person is said to have the power to exercise 
discretion–the freedom to act within certain limits. Corruption takes place in institutions 
where public officials have great authority; can exercise discretion with respect to 
interpretation and application of regulations; are not required to be accountable to 
anyone and are driven by greed. 4. The absence of transparency. Where there is no 
transparency in an organization, i.e. where tasks and functions are conducted in secret 
and are not open to examination by other government officers or the public, the 
opportunity for corruption increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for democracy in 
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which sovereignty is vested in the people and the conduct of civil servants must be open 
to examination. It is therefore vital that citizens in general and the media (radio, 
television, newspapers) in particular are guaranteed the right to freedom of speech; the 
media can inform citizens of any action by a civil servant that might be corrupt in nature 
and appropriate calls for action can be made. A transparent system deters corruption as 
the conduct of civil servants is under constant scrutiny. 5. The absence of 
accountability. In a democracy, public leaders and civil servants must be accountable to 
the people they serve. Accountability means that public leaders and officers must 
provide logical and acceptable explanations for their actions and decisions. Civil 
servants and officers in responsible positions must at all times adhere to the principles 
of transparency and be accountable to the people they serve. However, accountability is 
dependent on the enforcement of rules, regulations and policies, if there is a lack of 
effective institutional mechanisms civil servants cannot be held accountable and corrupt 
practices can flourish. 6. The absence of a watchdog institution. If there are no internal 
or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of corruption or that act on 
complaints relating to corruption, employees may take advantage of the fact that the 
chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote. Even if the offender is 
caught, the consequences would probably be minimal if the system has no watchdog 
function. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
    
In China, the situation is quite serious. According to the Global corruption report 2008 
issued by the Transparency International, Denmark Sweden and New Zealand are the 
cleanest top three countries around the world, Singapore is the fourth, and Finland and 
Switzerland are both holding the fifth position, China is in the middle which holds the 
72
nd
 place among all together 180 countries. 
 
The People‘s Republic of China, since its establishment in 1949, has witnessed so many 
dramatic and profound changes and evolutions both internally and externally throughout 
the half of the century till today. These changes and evolutions includes the political 
program, administrative structures, economical policies and the ideology of people, but 
no matter how things change, one thing remains the same, that is corruption among 
government officials.  
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Throughout its history from 1949, China launched several big campaigns of anti– 
corruption under the different theories advocated by different leaders in different 
periods of time. During Mao‘s time, the Three Anti Movement was the most featured 
one. And the case of Zhang and Liu was the most influential incident that reflected 
Mao‘s idea of inculcation should come first when investigating the crime of corruption, 
no tolerance and condonement when it comes to the punishment of those who were 
found guilty of corruption, stressing the importance of supervision. 
 
Even though his ideology and theory had led to a great achievement in lessening the 
corruption and other major social problems, there still were some limits and even 
drawbacks if we look at it objectively, especially from toady‘s perspective. The analysis 
of these limitations will be detailed in the paper as well as the anti–corruption that was 
launched during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. 
  
After Chairman Mao, China entered a time when the party engaged not only in 
reforming and opening–up but also fighting corruption under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping. China began to push the concept of building a fine party culture and keeping 
its organizations clean in the process of comprehensive reforming, opening–up and 
socialist modernization. Deng Xiaoping‘s theory and ideology of fighting against 
corruption and building up a clean government will also be discussed in a more detailed 
way later in the paper.  
 
After the Third Plenary Session, the Chinese government under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping realized the limitations of the previous anti–corruption approaches and started 
to learn from these lessons and experiences, and determined that the right road leading 
to anti–corruption was the ―rule of law‖. Laws and regulations were formulated and 
enacted. However, with the booming market economy, the corruption situation in China 
was made worse by the lack of balanced monitoring power in the period of transforming 
the planned economy into a socialist market economy. China witnessed 4 stages of 
fluctuation of corruption which are presented in Chapter 3. 
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When China was struggling to develop effective anti–corruption measures to curb 
deteriorating corruption situation, the successful example concerning this issue was set 
by Singapore who shares a lot of commonalties with China. These commonalities are 
analyzed in Chapter 4 as part of the framework of analysis. 
 
Besides the common factors, the most important reason Singapore is chosen to be the 
comparative example of my study is that according to the Global corruption report 2008 
issued by the Transparency International, Singapore is holding the top fourth place of 
least corrupt countries in the world while China was only the 72
nd
. Why the two 
neighboring countries with the similar cultural backgrounds performed so differently in 
building their governments, and what kind of experiences and lessons can China learn 
so that it could benefit from it are questions that are introduced in Chapter 4. 
 
The analysis of Singapore‘s experience begins with a brief introduction of its history. 
Singapore has a tortuous history of independence just like China, and it was not 
corruption–free from the very beginning of its independence due to complex historical 
reasons. 
 
The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is world famous as it played a vital role in 
constructing a clean government in Singapore especially after Lee Kuan Yew and his 
People‘s Action Party took power in the country. The introduction of the CPIB is drawn 
in details in Chapter 4. 
 
The strict and integrated legal system is the key factor that ensured the prevention and 
punishment of corruption. The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Corruption, Drug 
Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act are the most 
important anti–corruption laws that guide not only the CPIB but also the entire country 
concerning the issue of corruption. The introduction and analysis of these laws are 
resented in Chapter 4, other preventive measures can also be found in this chapter.   
 
Since corruption is caused by both the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt, the 
integrated legal system that includes both the preventive measures and severe 
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punishment has succeeded in reducing possible corruption opportunities and deter the 
public officers from being corrupted. Other than an effective CPIB and an integrated 
legal system, government leaders‘ determination of fighting corruption is also a key 
element that could lead to clean government. 
 
The success of CPIB was what caught China‘s eye. After the study and analysis of the 
Singapore example, China started to follow Singapore‘s footsteps by establishing 
similar anti–corruption agencies. However, what seemed to work in Singapore did not 
function well in China. The reason to this problems as well as the comparative analysis 
are given in Chapter 4. 
 
Another catching part of the Singaporean example of fighting against corruption and 
building up clean government is what Chinese called the approach of high salary for 
nourishing a clean government. The reason why it is considered responsible for building 
the clean government and why it is going to help China to build a clean government by 
some Chinese are explained in Chapter 4 as well as the reality of this approach. The 
steps that have to be achieved in advance before China decides to employ this approach 
and the reason why I believe that it is not appropriate to be applied in China under the 
current circumstances can also be found in this Chapter.     
 
 
1.2. Literature Review  
 
Traditionally, corruption was seen in a moralistic perspective, as a pathological and 
negative phenomenon springing from the unscrupulous motives of dishonest individuals 
(Stechina 2008: 28). Moralists see corruption as immoral, unethical. Myrdal 
characterizes corruption as ―selfish and improper conduct‖ (Myrdal 1968). However, 
this kind of definition is subjective. It is difficult to take the observer‘s moral or 
normative judgment away while constructing the definition, and the tendency to 
condemn also impeded the objective analysis. The limitations of a moralist approach are 
that it tends to individualize a societal phenomenon. To see corruption as a problem of 
bad incumbents would lead to a worse solution. By ignoring the systemic causes, 
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moralist solution make the underlying conditions worse. It tends to dichotomize what is 
good and what is bad. What is corruption and the extend whether a corruption is 
acceptable is relative and evolves through time. 
 
Even if central, norm–defining institutions have widespread legitimacy, in many 
instances the legal system has not succeeded in identifying corruption actions with 
precision. 
 
The weakness of moralist arguments is that they take little account of the societal 
context, nor do they examine the gap between the formal norms and the underlying 
practice–girded norms (Caiden & Caiden 1977).  Heidenheimer (1970) categorized the 
nature of corruption into three groups: 1. market–centered orientation, 2. public–
interest–centered approach, and 3. public office–centered perspective.   
 
Market–centered definitions as Heidenheimer explained to Jacob Von Klaveren:  A 
corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he 
will...seek to maximize. The office then becomes a "maximizing unit." The size of his 
income depends...upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of 
maximal gain on the public's demand curve (Johnston 2004: 10) seem to be particularly 
relevant to define corruption as an act to pursue economical benefits. These definitions 
replace the ―moral‖ or ―public interest‖ consideration with ―profit maximization‖ as the 
prime motivator. As such, they suggest that corruption is only another means of 
acquiring economic resources which lies into the framework of ―functionalist‖ (Gibbons 
1985). 
 
The public–office centered definitions what Peters and Welch (1978: 3) call the 
legalistic definition can be illustrated by reference to the work of J.S. Nye who defined 
corruption as ―behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (effective 
or appointive) because of private–regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
wealth or status gains, or violates rules against the exercises of certain types of private–
regarding influence (Nye 1967: 417). James C. Scott Agrees with Nye and uses his 
definition explicitly (Scott 1972: 3–5). Here the standards defining abuse are the law, or 
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regulations that have the force of law. Advocates of this approach point out that the law 
is in most societies more precise and stable than public opinion or conceptions of the 
public interest (Johnston 2004: 9).  Heidenheimer contends that the legalistic view is too 
narrow and Nye acknowledges the difficulties of applying legal standards in many 
settings.  
 
Public–interest–centered definitions are mainly expressed in the writing of Friedrich 
and Rogow and Lasswell. According to Friedrich (1966: 74): The pattern of corruption 
can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing things, i.e. who 
is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally 
provided for induced to take actions which favor whosoever provides the rewards and 
thereby does damage to the public and its interests. Another definition proposed by 
Rogow and Lasswell (1970:54): A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one 
system of public or civil order and is in fact incompatible (destructive of any system). A 
system of public or civil order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of 
the common interest for special advantage are corrupt.  
 
These definitions broadened the range of corrupt behavior because they offer the 
concept of public interest. However, it is problematic to precisely determine what public 
interest is and to his credit, Friedrich seeks to retain an important moral aspect of 
corruption—harm to the public. But even if ―the public interest‖ had a reasonably 
precise meaning, let alone one comparable from time to time and place to place, the 
definition of corruption, and its consequences, are different issues. And in fact, 
consequences might be complex. Harm may be tangible or intangible, short– or long–
term, concentrated or widely distributed; given such contrasts and their possible 
underlying causes, it is doubtful that we gain anything analytically by attempting to 
resolve questions of consequences by definition. A given kind of corruption could do 
harm on balance but still be preferable to the real alternatives. Corruption could 
integrate elites on a more stable basis, and thus encourage short– to medium–term 
economic growth, while preempting democratizing forces and creating accumulated 
economic imbalances over the longer term (Johnston 2004: 11).   
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Functionalism looks corruption in terms of actual function that it plays in 
socioeconomic development. Functionalist examines the utilitarian consequences, 
whatever the morality involved, of certain corrupt behaviors. ―Revisionists‖ among the 
functionalists who critique the earlier view that corruption is absolutely harmful find 
corruption to be useful in certain circumstances: in a society characterized by inefficient 
economic systems, political departicipation, and organizational slowness, corruption can 
create a kind of efficiency. ―If the prevailing system is bad, then corruption may be 
good‖ (Klitgaard 1988: 33). Functionalism was at its height in 1960s, and it considers 
corruption as an alternative means of influence for marginalized social sectors, it puts 
grease in the gear, allowing cumbersome regulations and administrative red tape to be 
circumvented (Stechina 2008: 28). However, the supposed benefits of corruption need 
to be analyzed. Caiden (1980) said that promotion or tolerance of corruption, even as 
palliative, can only serve to soften the state further. 
 
Some forms of corruption may be beneficial, others deleterious. Corruption may be 
useful in some ways, as in cutting corners, speeding services, or facilitating integration 
of outgroups, but harmful in others, such as societally unproductive, morally repugnant, 
economically distorting, and politically delegitimizing. 
 
Corruption is conceived as the dark side of human conduct–unethical behavior, 
religiously branded as sin. It connotes standards, norms concerning how those in public 
office should behave but from which they have departed, have abused, have fallen short, 
or have let everybody down (Caiden 2001: 277). In his study of ―Dealing with 
Administrative Corruption‖ Caiden (1999) identified the following factors to be crucial 
in curbing corruption: 
 
1. Moral and trustworthy leaders (and their close relations). Able and virtuous people 
have to be attracted to public service and retained without great personal sacrifice. They 
have to be carefully selected, screened, and monitored to see that their hands (and shoes 
of their close relatives) remain clean. There has to be instant removal from office of 
anyone with dirty hands and immediate disciplinary action against anyone who 
condones corruption.   
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2. Appropriate social regulation. A root cause of corruption is social control for which 
there is virtually no support. Outward conformity is only achieved at the cost of sullen 
resentment and common cause to evade such controls. Governance intervenes where it 
is unwelcome, which merely results in evasion and lack of enforcement.   
 
3. Regular law revision. Repeal is needed of vague, anachronistic, and internally 
contradictory laws and regulations that prevent the law–abiding from conducting their 
business in a lawful manner. In every jurisdiction there are probably orders that have 
outlived their usefulness but remain in the books because no regular review and revision 
is instituted.  
 
4. Reduction of monopolies. Inevitably and almost unconsciously, monopolies exploit 
their position. Where competition cannot be introduced, they have to be carefully 
monitored and subject to transparency and full accountability to ensure their actions are 
legal, moral, productive, sensitive, and effective.  
 
5. Open democratic governance. Clearly, autocracies have a higher propensity to 
corruption. Every effort had to be made to ensure government in the sunshine. This is 
very difficult to obtain in private organizations and in public organizations that have 
been exempted for good reason from democratic norms, procedures, and controls. At 
the very good least, redress and compensation should be provided when wrongdoing 
occurs. 
 
6. Professionalism. Amateurism has its place in democratic governance but democratic 
administration requires professionals who adhere to professional ethics and standards, 
avoid harm, keep abreast of the state of the art, and are so jealous about their reputations 
that they ensure competent performance, discipline, and reliable self–policing. 
 
7. Competence. Wherever there is incompetence, corruption creeps in. system, order, 
and regularity are essential for the detection of abuses. Competent administration in 
itself is a major deterrent to corruption as irregularities are likely to be spotted quickly, 
long before they can be routinized.   
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8. Personal integrity. When all is said and done, there is no substitute for individual 
integrity and the unwillingness of people to compromise with corruption. People who 
know right from wrong rarely depart from norms and prefer exit to participation in 
wrongdoing. Ethics education is imperative and cannot be taken for granted.    
 
Also, Gould (1991: 467−480) suggested in his Administrative Corruption: Incidence, 
Causes, and Remedial Strategies that the following principles remedies for corruption 
have been tried or proposed in several countries:  
 
1. Commissions of Inquiry. According to Riley, commissions of inquiry are appointed 
when ―corruption scandal becomes public, or when changes within the government that 
can gain it good publicity, or when a serious financial loss or inefficiency is known to 
senior figures (and to a certain extent a process of face–saving has to take place(Gould 
qtd. Riley, S. 1983: 195–196). William deems that commissions of inquiry ―have 
proved a major growth industry‖ but it is not the ultimate solution because they ―always 
concern other people. Corrupt political almost never instigate inquiries into their own 
affairs unless they are certain to produce a cosmetic exoneration. (Gould qtd. Williams 
1987: 198)  
 
2. Codes of Ethics and of Leadership. According to Williams, the codes of ethics and 
leadership are proven useless, and the goals of setting standards and change by adopting 
these codes are crushed without consistent enforcement.  
 
3. A Free Press. A vigilant, well supported, freely inquiring press provides a means for 
the public to monitor governmental activities including ascertaining the extent of 
corruption in higher places.  
 
4. Tougher Laws and Enforcement. The temptation is great for governments faced with 
massive complaints about corruption to pass tough laws outlawing corruption in its 
various forms and establishing significant enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement 
of laws is vital, and it depends on the outer forces as investigators with sufficient 
authority to investigate, prosecutors with adequate authority to arrest and bring 
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deserving cases to trial, and a court system with unblocked power to assure impartial 
application of laws and justice.  
 
5. Anti–corruption Agencies. Some governments have reacted to the public outcry over 
the scourge of corruption by creating agencies charges with investigating and 
prosecuting allegations of corruption practices. However, these agencies do not have 
promising futures when they are interfered with the bureaucracy‘s discretion power, and 
the investigators are constrained by resource scarcity and outnumbered, or when the 
safety of the investigator and the citizens who denounce corruption cannot be assured.  
 
6. Systemic, Structural, and Policy Change. A judicious combination of external 
pressure for strengthened anti–corruption efforts (in the form of form, evidence–based, 
supportive advice and, if need be, as conditions of future aid) allied with mobilized 
internal support for reform is the answer for the possible policy change. These changes 
include: 1. Reform of personnel system, which includes job analysis and auditing; 
selection; salaries and incentives and sanctions. These measures could enhance civil 
servants‘ productivity, reduce their cost and diminish their drain on the taxpayers‘ 
hand–made money. 2. Strengthen the integrity of the auditing function. The auditing 
function is among the most promising for reducing corruption, yet the most susceptible 
to corruption, it should be insulated from politics. 3. Strengthen the integrity of the 
governmental bidding function. Like the auditing function, the government bid review 
function is, in systematically corrupt administrative systems, generally at the core of the 
system. 4. Decentralize and ―participatize‖ governmental systems. The more broadly 
citizens participate in government, especially at levels of plan preparation and service 
delivery, the more ―daylight will shine in,‖ and the more difficult it will be fir the 
authoritarian, centralized government institutions to act corruptly (Gould qtd. Gould 
1985). 5. Upgrade laws. The search for contradictions, weaknesses, and loopholes in the 
present legal system, often the result of an undigested colonial legacy, needs to be 
intensified. 6. Strengthen court and prosecutorial system. It is possible for laws to be 
strengthened and the power of investigatory and prosecutorial authorities reinforced to 
deal with corruption, and Spartan behavior in high places and strong political 
commitment from the ruling group greatly facilitate this goal. 7 Strengthen existing 
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anti–corruption strategies and forces and create new ones. Thought and effort need to be 
invested in studying the existing anti–corruption forces, analyzing their weaknesses, and 
proposing way of beefing them up. 
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2. CORRUPTION THEORY 
 
Corruption is one of the serious problems that people have realized for a long time and 
strived to put a stop to it but failed no matter how hard they tried. It cannot be denied 
that there are countries that manage to keep it under control and succeed in maintaining 
a relatively clean government but we should also be aware of the fact that according the 
Corruption Perception Index 2008 issued by the Transparency International, among 180 
countries that have been surveyed, only 34 countries scored over 6 points out of 10 
point (highly clean) (Transparency International 2008), which means that only less than 
20% of the world‘s governments pass the failing line. This means that over 80% of the 
participants are eliminated for not reaching the favorable point. The situation is severe 
and cannot be neglected.  
 
The word corruption is originally from the Latin word corruptus which means to 
destroy, nowadays, we use this word to describe the phenomenon of government 
officials conducting wrongful doings such as influencing the decision–making process 
of a public officer or authority, or influence peddling; dishonesty or breach of trust, by a 
public officer, in the exercise of his duty; insider dealing or the conflicts of interests; 
and influence peddling by the use of fraudulent means such as bribery, blackmail, which 
includes the use of election fraud. Any person who directly or indirectly accepts, agrees 
or offers to accept any gratification from any other person to benefit him or herself or 
any other person is guilty of the crime of corruption. The person who makes the offer or 
inducement to another to commit a corrupt practice is also guilty of the crime of 
corruption. Although there is an active and a passive side to the crime, both parties are 
equally guilty of corruption. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)  
 
There are plenty of definitions of corruption, here are some quotes that have been 
commonly used. In broad terms, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. 
It encompasses unilateral abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and 
nepotism, as well as abuses linking public and private actors such as bribery, extortion, 
influence peddling, and fraud. Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic 
offices and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized. Though corruption often 
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facilitates criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and 
prostitution, it is not restricted to these activities. For purposes of understanding the 
problem and devising remedies, it is important to keep crime and corruption analytically 
distinct. 
 
 
2.1. The definition of corruption 
 
In the Handbook on Fighting Corruption, the Centre for Democracy and Governance, 
corruption is defined as behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether 
politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, 
or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them. This would 
include embezzlement of funds, theft of corporate or public property as well as corrupt 
practices such as bribery, extortion or influence peddling. (Zero Tolerance for 
Corruption 2008a.) 
 
Whilst there is no single definition for corruption, common definitions include: 
A standard definition used by Transparency International (TI) defines corruption ―as the 
abuse of public power for private gain.‖ (Transparency International FAQ.) 
 
Corruption is an abuse of public power for private gain that hampers the public interest. 
Corrupt entails a confusion of the private with the public sphere or an illicit exchange 
between the two spheres. In essence, corrupt practices involve public officials acting in 
the best interest of private concerns (their own or those of others) regardless of, or 
against, the public interest. –United Nations Manual on Anti–Corruption Policy 2001. 
(Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.) 
 
An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and 
the rights of others. It includes bribery, but is more comprehensive; because an act may 
be corruptly done, though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by another. 
By Law Library‘s Lexicon. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)  
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World Menu (1992) defines corruption as the ―use of political influence for personal 
gain…inducement to or engagement in improper or wrongful acts.‖ 
 
The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; The 
solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. (Zero 
Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.) 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary identifies nine meanings of corruption that consist three 
aspects: first, corruption refers to process of physical decay, disintegration and 
decomposition with associated unwholesomeness and putrefaction. Secondly, 
corruption signifies moral deterioration and decay; a loss of innocence or decline from a 
condition of purity. The third aspect relates to the sphere of government and 
administration, to the discharge of public duties. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary corruption is ―the perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of 
public duties by bribery or favor‖ (Edevbaro 1998: 29.) 
 
Through all these definitions given above, we should have a basic idea about what 
corruption is. However, because there are too many definitions and explanations about 
this subject, it is hard for us to come to an agreement on the common sense of it.  In this 
study, I am going to combine all the ideas given above, analyze what they have in 
common and what are the differences so that the viewer would have a relatively clearer 
idea about what corruption involves.  
 
According to the above definitions, there are two things in common. First, corruption is 
an act that abuses public power for personal gain; second, corruption is an act that 
violates public interests. To be precise about the definition of corruption there are five 
points that need to be clear, which are: 1. to highlight the main body of corruption; 2. 
clear the behavior of corruption; 3. stress the purpose of corruption; 4. state the 
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consequences of corruption and 5. be abstract and theoretical. Considering the different 
situations in different counties and the 5 points given above, we can define the concept 
of corruption on two levels: in a broad sense, corruption is the exercise of public 
authority to use public power for personal gain which is seriously detrimental to the 
public interests. In the narrow sense, corruption is an act where the state power exerciser 
uses the power of the state for personal gain and seriously undermines the interests of 
the state and the people.  
 
Irrespective of whether it is in the broad sense or the narrow sense, there are four main 
factors in each definition which are: 1. the main body of corruption; 2. the behavior of 
corruption; 3. the purpose of corruption and 4. the consequences of corruption. Here I 
am going to explain these factors from the narrow sense. 
 
2.1.1. The Main Body of Corruption  
 
It should be the exerciser of state power including the state owned public servants and 
the non–governmental public servants who are entrusted with state power. The state 
owned public servants are people who get their income through the state financial 
system. Exercisers of state power are those who actually control the operation of the 
state power, and are able to abuse power for their personal propose. They are the ones 
who are qualified enough to be called the main body of corruption.  
 
The idea that those who interfere with the state power in an indirect way for their 
personal gain are as the main body of corruption is incorrect because corruption is the 
decay of the state regime itself. So even if the actions of those non–state–power–
exercisers have a close relation with corruption or even correspondent with it, we cannot 
call them the main body of corruption. Moreover, with the governmental downsizing, 
the transformation of the post function and the reform of the cadre and personnel 
system, the state government is entrusting some of the jobs to the people who work in 
the state–owned enterprises and private agencies such as asset evaluation, project 
auditing and verification. In a way, they are entrusted with state affairs and gain access 
to exercise state power which means they are also qualified as the main body of 
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corruption which means that one has to be extra careful when dealing with the concept 
of corruption with these new changes.  
 
2.1.2. The Behavior of Corruption  
 
Corruption is the abuse of state power. It has two aspects. First, using state power for 
personal gain; second, not using state power at all. For instance, the policeman who 
accepts bribe and sits aside watching the crime going on but does nothing to stop it is as 
guilty as the official who accepts the bribe and grants privilege to those who do not 
deserve it through the legal procedure, because misuse and not using the state power are 
both in the category of abusing state power. Meanwhile, state power exercisers also 
have their civil right when they are operating the state power, so to decide if one person 
is corrupted depends on if he or she takes advantage of the state power. (Zero Tolerance 
for Corruption 2008b.) 
 
2.1.3. The Purpose of Corruption 
 
The purpose of corruption is to meet private interests. It can be for the person himself or 
herself or for his or her friends or the community the person belong to, which at the 
basic level is for private interests. Here we should pay attention to the word interest. 
Interest is the meeting of human needs in certain economical and social relationships 
that includes material and mental gain. People who are corrupted are mainly after 
material possessions which is easy to tell judging by the amount of the embezzlement 
and bribes they get. However, according to Maslow‘s hierarchy of needs, mental 
interests and self realization also play important roles when dealing with corruption, so 
mental interests should be considered as well. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008b.) 
 
2.1.4. The Consequences of Corruption  
 
The severe damage to the state and people‘s interests is one of the consequences of 
corruption. Some people only see the damage but not as severe. It is neither operable 
nor healthy to treat some minor acts that damage the interests of the state and people as 
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corruption. The severity of the act should be considered when defining corruption 
because if not, there will be no specific target to really focus on and strike against. 
 
 
2.2. The Forms of Corruption. 
 
Having gone through the different definitions of corruption, it is necessary that we take 
a look at the different forms of corruption. Here I am listing some of the most 
recognized forms of corruption. 
 
Bribery The promise, offer or give of any benefit that improperly affects the actions or 
decisions of a public official. A bribe may be given to a public servant (direct), or to 
another person or entity (indirect). A bribe may consist of money, inside information, 
gifts, entertainment, sexual or other favors, a job, company shares etc. A variation of 
bribery occur where a political party or government is offered, promised or given a 
benefit that improperly affects the decisions of or actions by the party or government.  
Examples: 
A traffic officer accepts cash in order not to issue a traffic fine. 
Payroll abuses where personnel lists are inflated with the names of ghost workers and 
salaries are paid to officials‘ friends or relatives. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
 
Embezzlement Theft of resources by persons entrusted with authority and control over 
these valuable resources. 
Examples: 
Hospital staff steals medicines and sells them to private pharmacies. 
Government officials charged with food aid distribution steal a portion of food and sell 
it to other individuals. 
Embezzlement also includes the conversion of government property and personnel for 
private use. 
Examples: 
An official uses the government garage to repair his private vehicle. 
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A government official rents out his public house. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 
2008c.) 
Fraud A criminal deception, involving some form of trick, false pretence or 
representation to obtain a benefit or gain unjust advantage. 
Example: 
Claiming Travel and subsistence allowances without having undertaken a trip. (Zero 
Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
 
Abuse of power Using one‘s vested authority to improperly benefit or give undue 
preferential treatment to any group or individual (or using vested authority to 
discriminate against any group or individual). 
Example: 
An elected official responsible for maintaining all the roads in a Region assigns the road 
repair crews to areas where his/her constituents reside and neglects other areas in 
similar need of road repairs. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
 
Receiving an unlawful gratuity, favor or illegal commission The receipt of anything 
with value as extra compensation for performing official duties from others wishing to 
conduct business with the agency, institution or organization. 
Example: 
An official is paid a commission for allowing certain advantages when goods or 
services are bought. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
 
Favoritism The provision of services or resources according to personal affiliations such 
as family ties, party affiliation, tribe, religion, sect and other preferential groupings. 
Example: 
A public servant provides extraordinary services, commissions, jobs and favours to 
political allies, family and friends, while ordinary members of the public do not receive 
this special treatment. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.) 
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Nepotism Ensuring that family members are appointed to the public service or that 
family members receive contracts from state resources. Similar to conflict of interest 
and favoritism. 
Example: 
A head of department appoints his/her brother‘s child to a position despite that more 
suitable candidates applied for the same position. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 
2008c.) 
 
The different forms and examples given above is to give the reader a clearer idea of 
corruption so that they will have a better chance to recognize corruption from other 
different illegal acts that harm the state and people.   
 
 
2.3. The Causes of Corruption 
 
The next issue I would like to talk about is the cause of corruption, to find out what 
conditions allow corruption to occur and in which conditions does corruption continue 
to develop and spread. Most commonly, corruption lies in a culture where there seems 
to be very little or almost no punishment for it and where the rewards for being corrupt 
seem much greater than the risk of being caught but other than that, the things below 
also play a crucial part in nourishing corruption.   
 
Low salaries 
 
Corruption is often attributed to the low salaries of civil servants. This differentiates 
between need driven (satisfying basic requirements for survival) corruption and greed 
driven (satisfying desires for status and comfort that salaries cannot match) corruption. 
(Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
It may be true that it is more difficult to stay honest, hard–working and trustworthy on a 
low salary, but it is also true that most people with low salaries are still able to do so 
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and that many corrupt officials are people in high, responsible positions, earning good 
salaries. 
 
In conjunction, corrupt practices flourish in systems where employees have high job 
security; where the level of professionalism in the public service is low; and hence 
officials rather serve their own interests than perform their duty to serve the public. 
However, low salaries are not a valid reason for and do not justify corruption. (Zero 
Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
Culture 
 
A gift culture exists, particularly in Africa, in which it is tradition that a small reward is 
paid for services rendered. Such a gratuity or tip becomes part of the cultural 
environment and in certain countries the payment of such rewards is so embedded in 
tradition that any attempt to rein in the practice would be seen as an attack on treasured 
cultural values. In Africa, this was traditionally seen as awarding special honors to the 
Chief and, in this light, it often regarded as acceptable and ―normal‖ for politicians to 
accept such rewards. In some countries it is common practice in the commercial arena 
for business transactions to be accompanied by the giving of personal gifts or benefits, 
ranging from the Christmas bottle of whisky to much more elaborate and extravagant 
items. In essence, the root of corruption is greed rather than culture, public life requires 
a standard of its own; and those entering public office must be made aware of this from 
the outset. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
The absence of rules, regulations, policies and legislation 
 
All organizations, whether public or private sector, must have rules, regulations and 
policies that guide management and other employees in terms of acceptable behavior 
and conduct within the organization. Rules, regulations and policies are instrumental in 
organizing people, steering them towards a common goal and ensuring that everyone is 
treated fairly and equally. 
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In order to be effective, such rules and policies must be clearly communicated to all 
individuals in order to be understood and applied objectively. Corruption is more likely 
to flourish in an organization that does not have a wide range of rules, regulations or 
policies that guide employees in their work. Similarly, a country must have clear 
policies and legislation that guide the behavior of all citizens and residents within that 
country. However, organizations and countries must strike a reasonable balance in terms 
of policies and legislation; whilst corruption flourishes in an environment without clear 
rules and regulations, similarly, corruption finds fertile grounds in a country that has a 
numerous laws, rules and regulations that restrict business and economic activities. 
Such a climate creates industries‘ dependence on individual civil servants to engage in 
economic activity; thereby circumventing bureaucratic red tape through corrupt offers. 
(Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
Range of discretion 
 
No system can exist unless one person or authority is used, to some extent, to make 
decisions. Such a person is said to have the power to exercise discretion – the freedom 
to act within certain limits. Corruption takes place in institutions where public officials: 
have great authority; can exercise discretion with respect to interpretation and 
application of regulations; are not required to be accountable to anyone and are driven 
by greed. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
Therefore, an environment with a higher range of discretion without accountability is 
more conducive to corruption. In conjunction, political office is one of the primary 
means of gaining access to wealth in less developed countries. If corruption occurs on 
the top level and the political leadership of the country does not set a good example 
with respect to honesty, credibility, transparency, integrity and the prosecution of 
offenders, citizens become disillusioned and offenders are not deterred from entering 
into corrupt practices. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
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The absence of transparency 
 
Where there is no transparency in an organization, i.e. where tasks and functions are 
conducted in secret and are not open to examination by other government officers or the 
public, the opportunity for corruption increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for 
democracy in which sovereignty is vested in the people and the conduct of civil servants 
must be open to examination. It is therefore vital that citizens in general and the media 
(radio, television, newspapers) in particular are guaranteed the right to freedom of 
speech; the media can inform citizens of any action by a civil servant that might be 
corrupt in nature and appropriate calls for action can be made. A transparent system 
deters corruption as the conduct of civil servants is under constant scrutiny. (Zero 
Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
The absence of accountability 
 
In a democracy, public leaders and civil servants must be accountable to the people they 
serve. Accountability means that public leaders and officers must provide logical and 
acceptable explanations for their actions and decisions to the people they serve. Civil 
servants and officers in responsible positions must at all times adhere to the principles 
of transparency and be accountable to the people they serve. However, accountability is 
dependent on the enforcement of rules, regulations and policies, if there is a lack of 
effective institutional mechanisms civil servants cannot be held accountable and corrupt 
practices can flourish. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
 
The absence of a watchdog institution 
 
If there are no internal or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of 
corruption or that act on complaints relating to corruption, employees may take 
advantage of the fact that the chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote. 
Even if the offender is caught, the consequences would probably be minimal if the 
system has no watchdog function. (Zero tolerance for Corruption 2008d.) 
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3. CORRUPTION AND ANTI–CORRUPTION IN CHINA 
 
Although corruption is a universal phenomenon and exists in all countries, it is a more 
serious matter in less developed countries. The conditions of these countries are such 
that corruption is likely to have different causes and consequences than in more 
developed countries. Socio–economic conditions in low income countries are more 
conducive to the growth of corruption. Corruption is a symptom of deep–rooted 
economic and political weaknesses and shortcomings in the legislative and judicial 
system of the country. To aggravate the situation, accountability in these countries is 
generally weak, the chances of being caught are small and the penalties when caught are 
light. Non–governmental organizations that could serve as watchdogs and provide 
information on corrupt practices are generally not well developed. 
 
That brings out the purpose for this paper. China as a country with the fastest–growing 
economy yet is still in the group of developing countries. Although the corruption 
situation in China is not bright, it is not hopeless, and while the government really puts 
up the fight against corruption seriously, the outcome is not very satisfying.  
 
Here I am going to start with the little retrospect of the road of China‘s efforts and 
achievements in its fight against corruption.  
 
Since its establishment in 1949, the People‘s Republic of China has witnessed so many 
dramatic and profound changes and evolutions both internally and externally throughout 
the middle of the 20
th
 century until now. These changes and evolutions include the 
political program, administrative structures, economical policies and the ideology of 
people, but no matter how things change, one thing remains the same, that is corruption 
among government officials.  
 
The history of corruption is not what I am going to talk about in this chapter, however 
inevitably there are certain historical issues that we need to take into account, such as 
the different strategies the Chinese government adopted to fight corruption in different 
time periods in the recent fifty years and what kind of effectiveness these strategies 
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managed to accomplish. I will start with a flash back to the early times when the 
country had just earned its independence and strove to open up the situation and set up 
the foundation for the new born government.  
 
Chairman Mao first came up with the concept of ―Three Antis‖ which are Anti–
corruption; Anti–waste and Anti–bureaucracy on the 20th November, 1951, and on the 
first of December the same year, the ―Three Antis‖ campaign was officially initiated 
with the principle of combining the top down and bottom up strategy to discover and 
eliminate corrupt behavior, waste and bureaucracy (Shao Jingjun 2009). 
 
Chairman Mao emphasized the importance of initiating the campaign by noting that 
since the takeover of the country there were several cases of severe corruption which 
indicated the necessity of overcoming the erosive impact that the capitalism caused to 
the Communist Party of China by launching the campaign. He also stressed that the 
campaign was related to the death or life of the Party and the country, so the 
government had to take it as important as the movement of suppressing counter–
revolutionary, organizing the people including the democratic parties and the 
community with the same grand scale led by top officials in the government to discover 
corruption; call for come–forward confession and prosecution, criticize and inculcate 
those who committed lighter corruption, discharge and imprison(labor reform) those 
who committed heavier corruption and give death sentence to those who are most 
corrupted. (ibid.2009.) 
 
Chairman Mao clearly realized back then that the campaign is against the interests of 
some corrupt officials in all levels of the government which in turn would cause certain 
conscious or unconscious resistance from the officials. In order to deepen the impact of 
the campaign, he set the principle that the head chiefs of the party at all levels had to 
take charge and personally deal with the cases. It is documented that from 20
th
 of 
November to 31
st
 of December 1951, he wrote a huge amount of instructions, criticism 
and letters, approved and transmitted a number of reports concerning the issue, in which 
over 50 were marked as important (ibid.2009).  
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He praised those who did great in the campaign and criticized those who made little 
progress. Under his instructions and supervision, the head chiefs of all levels worked 
aggressively and the campaign was implemented thoroughly. In order to reinforce the 
progress that the campaign had achieved, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (shortened as CPC in later references) launched another campaign of 
Five Antis which were anti–bribery; anti–tax–evasion; anti–state property theft; anti 
jerry–building and anti–economic intelligence theft on 26th of January 1952. 
(ibid.2009.) 
 
By the 25
th
 of October, 1952, the Central Committee announced the official end of the 
campaign that had carried on for 11 months. During which, about 3.836 million people 
from government organs above county level participated in the campaign (excluding 
military personnel) and 105 thousand people were discovered committing the offences 
of embezzlement or accepting bribes over 10 million Yuan (old currency) which was 
2.7% of the total amount of people participated in the campaign. 6000 billion Yuan was 
taken or consumed by corrupted officials and 2000 billion of it was able to be recovered 
by the end October, 1952.  
 
Among those who were exposed during the campaign of conducting wrongful doings, 
most of them were remitted of punishment, some were given the administrative 
sanction, and those who corrupted huge amount of money with abominable means and 
intransigent attitude that caused serious damage to the state were given severe 
punishments. 9942 people were sentenced to prison for a definite term, 67 were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 with death sentences with a reprieve and 42 were 
sentenced to death which showed the principle of strict to some, lenient to most, 
focusing on the inculcation. (ibid.2009.) 
 
The ―Three Antis campaign‖ made big achievement in dealing with corruption, waste 
and bureaucracy and the case of Zhang Zishan and Liu Qingshan that had been 
processed by Chairman Mao was the most influential one that set the example of 
fighting corruption and building up a cleaner government which generated a strong 
positive impact on the future. 
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Liu and Zhang were both the Prefectural Party Committee Secretaries of the Tianjin 
City Committee of the CPC in sequence after the establishment of People‘s Republic of 
China. They joined the Party in 1930s and went through war with several military 
exploits. They withstood the hardness of the war but failed to keep up the good spirit 
and became corrupted after they were assigned to the position. They colluded with each 
other and embezzled money from the airport construction fund, flood relief loan and so 
on with the total amount of 15.54954 billion Yuan. During which time they were 
approached by the higher authority with attempt to save them from committing more 
wrongs but when all attempts proved useless, they were reported to Central Committee 
as one of the most notorious cases of the corruption situation in north China by the 
North China bureau which caught Chairman Mao‘s attention.  
 
When processing their case, some officials thought that that their contribution to the 
country should be taken into account and they should be spared the death sentence, but 
Chairman Mao held the opinion of that their status, contribution and influence were 
exactly the reason they should be sentenced to death because it would generate the most 
profound impact to those who went through the same situation and shared the same 
experience with them to not become corrupted.  
 
The death of these two would save the lives of thousands and even more lives of 
officials who were heading to the road of corruption. On the 20
th
 of February, Liu and 
Zhang were executed through the public trial assembled by the people‘s government of 
Hebei Province. The execution showed the determination of the newly established 
Chinese government to fight against corruption, improved the Party‘s prestige and 
deterred those who were corrupted to come forward and confess about their crimes. 
Government officials and public servants were taught the lesson, and the working style 
of the Party and the social atmosphere were greatly improved. (ibid.2009.) 
 
On 2
nd
 of November, 1954, Central Committee of CPC approved and transmitted the 
report about the corruption that occurred after the campaign of ―Three Antis‖ handed by 
the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council. The report analyzed the features of the 
corruption happened after the campaign which were: it was commonly seen in those 
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who had direct access to money and property; the amount of money that had been 
embezzled by individuals was huge and the behavior of corruption was in a more 
discreet manner. In response to these characteristics, thorough investigation of 
corruption cases was requested as well as the strengthening of ideological and moral 
education of cadres so as to establish the moral concepts of securing the state property 
with the establishment of sound financial management system to positively plug the 
corruption loopholes. (ibid.2009.) 
 
In 1956, China had basically completed the socialist transformation of Private–owned 
System of Producer Goods and began to embark on the road of socialist construction. 
How to build socialism while maintaining the integrity of the Party and its cadres is a 
new topic the Party and the people were facing. From 1956 to 1966, the Party had 
explored many paths of building a clean government and launched several big battles of 
anti–corruption, put forward many new ideas, new approaches and had achieved many 
valuable results (ibid.2009). However, during this period, Chairman Mao began and 
some other leaders had gone down a path of no longer facing up to reality and 
respecting the objective laws. This led the fight against corruption gradually to embark 
on a tortuous path.  
 
The ―Cultural Revolution‖ that happened during May 1966 and October 1976 is 
considered the biggest mistake in the history of CPC. The ―cultural revolution‖ is not 
and cannot in any sense be a revolution or social progress. It makes the Party and the 
people of China suffered the most serious setbacks and losses since the foundation of 
the PRC. The fight against corruption carried out in this kind of special social 
environment was only a deformed struggle (ibid.2009). Anti–corruption in this period 
seemed to have very effective results but the fact is that it was done with excessive costs 
and serious side effects. Considering that Chairman Mao‘s concept and ideology of 
fighting corruption was the main pushing power in this period of time, it is necessary to 
analyze the basic content of his anti–corruption theory here.  
 
Mao Zedong was the chief founder of the People‘s Liberation Army, the Communist 
Party of China and the People‘s Republic of China and he was also the man who set the 
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important theoretical and strategic foundations of how to fight against corruption. After 
the establishment of PRC, the ruling status of the Party and the peaceful environment 
increased the danger of going astray from the people and reality as well as the risk of 
corruption. In this regard, Chairman Mao led the Party to actively explore the means 
and paths of maintaining a clean government under the given conditions and gradually 
formed a relatively systematic and scientific ideology–the Mao Zedong Thought of 
Anti–Corruption which is a representation of the experience and wisdom of anti–
corruption practices that the first generation leaders of CPC had accumulated, which is 
also an important part of Mao Zedong Thought. Here we are going to take a closer look 
into his theory of anti–corruption. (ibid.2009.) 
 
First is the question of why should China fight against corruption. Mao Zedong believed 
that the degeneration of political ideology, corruption in economy, and the squandering 
for the enjoyment of life all belong to the scope of corruption. Corruption is the 
reflection of the ideology of exploiting classes in the Party and the government and the 
battle of anti–corruption is an important component of the proletarian class struggle. He 
considered that corruption was a behavior of anti–Party and anti–socialists, and the 
corrupt officials were the black sheep in the Party and government whose sole purpose 
was to exploit the people and destroy the very existence of the Party and the country. 
When talking about the ―Three Antis Campaign‖, he thought that the struggle of anti–
corruption, anti–waste and anti–bureaucracy should be considered as important as the 
struggle of suppressing the counter–revolutionaries (ibid.2009).  
 
Based on this understanding of corruption, as early as after the establishment of the 
country, Chairman Mao called out that all our people and staff of the government 
should work with one heart to vigorously and resolutely carry out the large–scale 
opposition against corruption, against waste and bureaucracy to break down and wash 
away these poisonous old legacies. This is actually the very idea of seeing the acts of 
building a clean government by fighting against corruption as the basic foundation of 
establishing the Party and the country.     
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Second is the cause of corruption. Chairman Mao deemed that the class origin was the 
main cause of corruption which was also the poisonous old legacy. Besides this, 
bureaucracy and liberalism were the important reasons that the corruption phenomenon 
was able to exist and grow. 
 
Third is the issue of whom should China depends on when fighting against corruption. 
He thought that the CPC was the only dependable leading force which the nation must 
follow and the mass people of the grass root were the source of power in the battlefield 
of fighting against corruption. The reason why the battle against corruption must be led 
by the Communist Party of China was because the Chinese Communist Party ―serves 
the people wholeheartedly and will never be divorced from the masses; everything the 
Party considers of doing is for the people‘s interests, rather than for the interests of 
individual or small groups‖. The CPC represented only the interest of proletariat and the 
majority of the people, and is clean for it was not looking for any special kind of private 
interest for itself. ―All of our staff, regardless of rank and status, are servants of the 
people. Everything we do, we do it to serve the people‖ this statement was drawn for 
that the Party was equipped with the scientific theory of Marxism and could fight 
against corruption in accordance with its rules and disciplines.  
 
In China, there was no other kind of political force like the Chinese Communist Party 
that could lead the people onto the right path of fighting against corruption and achieve 
complete victory. As he believed in the purity of the Party, Chairman Mao also believed 
in the power of people. He truly thought that ―the people are the true heroes‖. All for 
people and all depending on people was the core of his leadership theory and the anti–
corruption theory. By summing up historical experiences, he clearly pointed out: ―As 
long as we are able to master the science of Marxism–Leninism, trust the masses and 
bring them closely together and lead them forward, we could transcend any obstacle and 
overcome any difficulties, and the strength we have is invincible‖ (ibid.2009).  
 
The fourth question is how to fight corruption. Chairman Mao advocated the 
combination of inculcation, sanction and supervision, meanwhile kept an eye on the 
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relation between the task of anti–corruption and other major tasks the Party was 
engaging in. 
 
1. When fighting against corruption, Chairman Mao always thought that education 
should come first. To establish the Marxist outlook on world, on life and power for the 
majority of Party members and cadres through education was the ideological basis of 
anti–corruption. There were five aspects of inculcation which were the objective 
education of serving the people; the traditional education of working hard and 
perseveringly; the style education of criticism and self–criticism; the experiential 
education of history and previous lessons and the education of examples. 
 
2. Chairman Mao held a very strong and tough attitude towards corruption with no 
tolerance and condonement when it comes to the punishment of those who were found 
guilty of corruption, never fishing in the muddy water or just going through motions. He 
was not only putting forward approaches, but also supervising the process personally; 
not only giving instructions, but also solutions. In particular, he paid special attention to 
major cases and dared to tackle tough problems. The case of Zhang Qinshan and Liu 
Zishan was the best demonstration of his firm attitude towards corruption and corrupted 
officials which not only exposed the corruption, waste and bureaucracy that existed 
within the Party and state organs in the broad range and offered corresponding 
punishment, but also sent a vivid message to the majority of Party members and cadres 
and also gave them a profound ideological education on anti–corruption which built a 
solid foundation for the clean and efficient working environment for the Party and its 
government. (ibid.2009.) 
 
3. Stressing the importance of supervision. Firstly, the inner–Party supervision. 
Chairman Mao believed that a sound democratic life is the fundamental guarantee of 
implementing the inner–Party supervision and carrying out the activity of criticism. He 
raised two principles of the inner–Party supervision: First, tell all that one knows and 
tell it without reserve; second, blame not the speaker but be warned by his words. In 
order to ensure that inner–Party supervision of the organization was achieved, he 
proposed, in the early days of the founding of the country, that the Party should 
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establish a Commission for Discipline Inspection which was approved and implemented 
right away. Secondly, the supervision by the masses. He personally handled people‘s 
letters, and earnestly warned the chief officials of all levels to listen to the voices of the 
people. Broad participation and supervision of the masses effectively promoted the 
anti–corruption work. Then it is democratic supervision. Mao founded the CPC–led 
multi–Party cooperation system, set up the ―long–term coexistence and mutual 
supervision‖ approach with the democratic parties. He thought highly of the advice 
from non–Party personages, and actively listened to and accepted their reasonable 
suggestions. Finally, media monitoring. Mao attached great importance to the 
supervisory role of newspapers and magazines and stressed that the press should publish 
people‘s letters, reflecting the people‘s voices and demands to monitor the 
government‘s work. (ibid.2009.) 
 
4. Chairman Mao valued the dynamic integration of the task of fighting against 
corruption with the Party‘s central work and other tasks. He stressed that: ―The Party 
committee must pay close attention to the central task as well as other tasks by carrying 
out other aspects of the work while doing the central task. We can not only focus on one 
part and ignore the rest of the problems‖ (ibid.2009). 
 
Even though his ideology and theory had led to a great achievement in lessening the 
corruption and other major social problems, there still were some limits and even 
drawbacks if it was looked at objectively, especially from toady‘s perspective. For 
example, as to the causes of corruption, he put too much emphasis on classes, but not 
enough on the economical and institutional reasons. Moreover, it was crucial that anti–
corruption should rely on the masses, but adopting the ―Mass Democracy‖ and ―Mass 
Movement‖ approaches caused a number of negative effects. So if we carefully review 
and sum up the experiences and lessons that had obtained from the series of fights 
against corruption led by Chairman Mao from 1956 to 1976, it will be helpful for 
people to avoid making detours in the future when coming across the similar situations. 
 
The first lesson learned is that China cannot idealize the process of building up a clean 
government. After the establishment of the new China, Chairman Mao was very 
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idealistic about the development of the country. He initiated the Great Leap Forward 
and the movement to establish people‘s communes in 1958 which attempted to ―running 
into communism‖ under the conditions of not developing the social productive forces, 
especially the commodity economy (ibid.2009). Even through his idealistic idea had 
been challenged through practice and had been criticized by other Party members, he 
was still persistent about these ideas. During the Cultural Revolution, he once again 
pictured the blueprint of his ideal society.  
 
He claimed that the whole country to be ―the big school of communism‖ and all trades 
and professions of the society to became a economically self–sufficient or semi–self–
sufficient social organization that progressively restrict the social division of labor and 
commodity production as well as the principle of distribution according to work and 
material interests. He wanted everyone in the society to be the ―critic of the old world 
and the builders and defenders of the New World‖ who can ―work if pick up the 
hammer, farm if pick up the hoe and rake, fight enemies if pick up the weapon and write 
articles if pick up the pen‖ (ibid.2009).  
 
He also promoted the concept of ―narrowing the differences between industrial and 
agricultural work, between the urban and rural area, and between manual and mental 
work‖ so that in such kind of a society, the government officials and the masses could 
merge with each other and become a harmonious whole and there would be no graft and 
corruption because the government officials were serving the people wholeheartedly 
with no consideration of self–interests and profit. But as reality proved over and over 
again, his idealistic state of country could never be realized under the given conditions 
and the anti–corruption war under these concepts and ideology would never be won. We 
have to come back to the idea that Chairman Mao had always advocated–proceeding 
from reality and seeking truth from facts. 
 
The second lesson is that anti–corruption cannot be carried out in the form of a 
campaign. Mao was too drenched in the idea of building a perfect and pure socialism 
country, so when he saw that in reality many cadres gradually became the ―decadent top 
dog who takes the capitalist road‖ with layer upon layer protection over their heads, he 
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decided to apply the mass movement that came most handy to him to solve the problem. 
He included anti–corruption into the scale of class struggle to make impact on the 
corrupted officials and ―trigger an inner–revolution deep down in their soul‖ (ibid.2009) 
through a rather aggressive way. It was effective in scaring those who were planning to 
go corrupted to drop the idea, but was more destructive to the Party and the country by 
mixing different kind of conflicts that messed up the society and economy, caused a 
number of unjust, false and erroneous cases. 
 
The third lesson is that power cannot be absolutized. The Cultural Revolution was 
seemingly promoting Mass Democracy, but in fact it was the absolutization of the 
supreme power. Democratic centralism was completely destroyed in the Party. And 
Chairman Mao was the ―Great teacher, great leader, great commander in chief, and 
great helmsman‖ who stood above the Party and the government. His words were the 
absolute truth and supreme instruction to the Party, the country and the people that 
should be executed resolutely. However, absolute power was proved to be an illusion 
and a farce when the Gang of Four emerged with their hidden agenda of serving their 
own interests in the disguise of implementing Chairman Mao‘s instructions which 
indicated that the power absolutization, no matter in what form, would eventually 
become the paradise for corruption. The attempt to fight corruption by using the 
absolute power is just a fantasy, just as Lord Acton accurately expressed ―Power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely‖. (ibid.2009.) 
 
The forth lesson is that the society cannot be disorganized. The direct representation of 
Cultural Revolution is ―chaos‖. The notion of ―suspect everything, and down with 
everything‖ was a universal idea of the whole nation at that time. It was said that the 
―chaos is the perfect time to disturb the enemy and train the masses‖, but even Mao 
himself felt that this was the wrong way of doing things. Instead of chaos, he put 
forward that ―the stability and unity of the society is a better way". It had been proved 
by facts that chaos was never a good thing when you were already in the ruling status of 
the nation and controlled political power. All the social problems, including corruption, 
could never be settled in the chaotic environment. Order should be secured if China 
wants to create good living condition for the people, to maintain the social and 
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economical development as well as to fight against corruption and build a clean 
government. The implementation of democracy and nomocracy is essential when a 
stable political situation and an orderly social environment are in need. This is the 
profound and most valuable lesson that the CPC had learnt from the Cultural 
Revolution. (ibid.2009.) 
 
All the lesson learned from Chairman Mao‘s strategic moves of anti–corruption 
analyzed above are important for us to study and use for reference in the future, one 
should also be aware that all the limitations and drawbacks are with its historical 
reasons. It is simply not acceptable to completely deny the historical periods and 
incidents with great influence just because they were considered to be flawed. Chairman 
Mao‘s theory of fighting against corruption was not perfect and in fact caused serious 
problems to the Party, the people and the nation, but still, it was with some positive 
aspects. In theory, it had laid a solid foundation for CPC to construct the anti–corruption 
theory with Chinese characteristics. In practice, it had succeeded in suppressing the 
trend of corruption that rapidly emerged in the early days after the founding of the new 
China which created a relatively clean and honest working style of government as well 
as the social and Party conduct in 1950s that have been praised by people up to today. 
 
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, especially since the Third Plenary Session of 
the 11
th
 Central Committee, by setting things right, the new China‘s anti–corruption 
struggle had gradually embarked on a healthy track. 
 
After the Third Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central Committee, China entered the new 
historical stage of reform, opening–up, and socialist modernization, the construction of 
the Party‘s discipline and a clean government was also different from the previous time. 
The overall situation was that the violations of the law and breaches of discipline in 
some localities and departments increased sharply and corruption was occurring in a 
quite aggressive manner with the features listed below. 
 
1. The phenomenon of the cadres seeking privileges was getting more and more serious. 
A lot of cadres who had been prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution were 
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reassigned to the government positions, most of which was working hard with assiduity 
as they were before, but some considered themselves to be mistreated and deserved a 
little payback. So it seemed only righteous for them to seek privileges and get some 
compensation by misusing the public power they were entrusted with. Such as building 
private houses by exploiting one‘s office or opening a back door for their children and 
relatives in order to offer them better jobs, better education, promotion and so on. 
(ibid.2009.) 
 
2. The phenomenon of bribery and corruption as well as seeking illegitimate interests 
began to spread which was manifested in the way that some cadres took advantage of 
their position and power to embezzle public funds, misappropriate public property, ask 
for and accept briberies and smuggle and sell contrabands and so on. The country was 
in the age of shortage economy at that time. By abusing power or pulling strings, the 
officials were able to buy the expensive imports like colored TVs, washing machines, 
VCRs and other high–end consumer products with low–cost or a nominal payment from 
the business units to meet their private needs, which was a main reason why corruption 
became prevalent. (ibid.2009.) 
 
In 1982, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that since the implementation of the policy of 
reform and opening–up and invigorating the domestic economy, there were a 
considerable number of cadres who had been corrupted in a short period of one to two 
years. The number of officials who had been drawn into the economical crimes was not 
small, but huge. According to the statistics, the number of cases that had been 
investigated by the Chinese prosecutorial organs for corruption in 1979 was 702 and 
8181 in 1980, 15753 in 1981, and 29563 in 1982, which showed a significant upward 
trend of corruption occurring during this period of time (ibid.2009).  
 
The features of corruption that happened in that time were: 1. The briberies that had 
been asked for and accepted were in the form of material possession. That is because the 
nation was in the period of shortage economy, the material goods were in short supply, 
and many household items could not be bought even with money. Thus, bribery in 
material form was quite popular at that time. 2. Corruption was mostly occurred in the 
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department that was in charge of import and export and the department of material 
resources and department of planning. 3. The corrupted officials in this period were 
mainly the persons in charge of the Party and government organs. They took advantage 
of the time when there was no specific restriction on powers and vigorously engaged in 
the way of seeking illegitimate interests and privileges by abusing the power they were 
entrusted with. 4. The means of corruption applied during this period was mainly the 
misuse of the distributive power of planed material and goods in short supply for 
personal gain which undermined the unity of the national plan and the fairness of the 
distribution. (ibid.2009.) 
 
The 10 years from the Party‘s 12th National Congress in September 1982 to the 14th 
National Congress in October 1992 was the time China began to implement the policy 
of reforming and opening–up comprehensively. After the Setting Things Right from the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee and initial reform and opening–
up, China started great social changes in many aspects. It changed the economical 
system from a planned economy to a planned commodity economy, then to a socialist 
market economy; it started the reform first in the rural areas then gradually shifted it in 
the cities and the opening–up to the outside world was also extended to a deeper level, 
which greatly enhanced the enthusiasm of the people to change the world as well as the 
vitality of the development of the whole society.  
 
Meanwhile, the imperfect political and administrative system, the big misunderstanding 
in thinking caused by the great rapid changes and the expending of the space for people 
to pursue self–profit had led to a dramatic growth in corruptive conduct of public 
officers (ibid.2009). China entered the time when the Party engaged not only in 
reforming and opening–up but also fighting against corruption under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping. China began to push the concept of building a fine Party culture and 
keeping its organizations clean in the process of comprehensive reforming, opening–up 
and socialist modernization.  
 
For Deng, the core of his anti–corruption theory is the persistence of anti–corruption in 
the whole process of reforming and opening–up (ibid.2009). In his point of view, the 
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persistence of anti–corruption in the entire reforming and opening–up process is not 
only the important aspect of constructing the spiritual civilization of socialism but also 
the necessary condition for constructing the material civilization of socialism. If people 
keep a closed eye on the corruptive environment, it would eventually come and haunt 
the country despite how much progress China made in developing its economy. Besides 
this, the other important parts of his anti–corruption theory consist of the following 
aspects: to deal with the corruptive problem with the educational and legal methods; 
anti–corruption process should start from within the Party then spread to the whole 
nation. Also, it should start from the head officials to set up examples for the people 
below and there should be an outside supervisory power with the help of the people to 
examine the whole anti–corruption procedure.  
 
The basic content of Deng‘s anti–corruption theory included the following 7 aspects: 
 
1. China should always adhere to the principle of promoting the reform and opening up 
to the outside world and at the same time strengthen the construction of the legal system 
in the process of fighting against corruption (ibid.2009). The reform and opening up to 
the outside world side of this principle remained the same in years while the other side 
had been changing over the time, it originally was about striking the economical crimes, 
then changed into constructing the legal system, and then in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century it was developed into fighting against corruption. Although the focus shifted a 
bit with time, the importance of valuing both party equally has not changed, it was 
always what Deng emphasized during his time. 
 
2. Anti–corruption should always be conducted on the basis of economical construction. 
In 1980, he had already raised the importance of economical construction. In his 
opinion, the economical construction was the centre of everything, and all the Chinese 
government did, it did it according to this central notion, if the government drifts away 
from it, it would face the risk of losing the economic base (ibid.2009). There is no 
exception on anti–corruption. Fighting against corruption and other economical crimes 
is the building up of the solid foundation and setting up of the right direction for 
opening up to the outside world and vitalizing the national economy.  
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3. Anti–corruption should be implemented top down, which means starting from the 
head officials to the civil servants below. In his mind, the reason corruption was so 
intense was that the head officials consider themselves untouchable and above the law, 
and they can do whatever they want without being punished. So making them the main 
target in the battle of fighting against corruption is with great significance. It is not only 
good to clear up the corrupt environment but also good for setting the record straight for 
the people below to be aware of the consequences of being corrupted. (ibid.2009.) 
 
4. Anti–corruption should be focusing on strengthening and completing the construction 
of the legal system. He pointed out in 1980 that the system is the key to everything, a 
good system can prevent bad people from doing bad things and a bad one can make 
good people unable to do good things. The system he was talking about was the system 
that enables people‘s democratic rights as well as the legal system. He stressed the 
importance of completing the legal system in fighting against corruption again in 1990 
when talking about anti–corruption and building a clean government. He advocated 
building a sound legal and social system to restrain people‘s behavior as well as the 
supervisory system to suppress corruption (ibid.2009).  
 
5. Anti–corruption should begin with education in order to prevent corrupt behavior 
from happening in the first place. He emphasized the essentiality of anti–corruption in 
the ideological sense. He said that the more our country develops, the more we should 
pay attention to nourish the righteous mind of anti–corruption (ibid.2009). From the 
above mentioned point, it is clear that Deng had inherited and developed the tradition of 
stressing the ideological construction and education of the Party. Especially since the 
reform and opening up, he had been advocating the ideal of conducting the education on 
discipline, legal system, value and hard working, which is with great importance for 
Party members, to establish a firm ideal and conviction, and to reinforce the law–
abiding concept, to improve anti–corruption awareness, and consciously resist the 
decadent ideas of corruption.   
 
6. It is essential to severely punish the offenders with corruptive behavior in the fight 
against corruption. The ideological education of anti–corruption is to strike at the root 
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while punishing the corruptive government officials is the strike to the symptom on the 
surface, only if the two are combined together, could China attain the maximized 
benefit from the anti–corruption war.  
 
7. The anti–corruption war is a long–term struggle (ibid.2009). It is not a temporary 
work, but something China should be always aware of and pay attention to. It does not 
end when one or several major cases are exposed and taken care of, nor does it end 
when the government thinks it have made some progress on suppressing corruption, as 
long as there is a sign showing there could be potential corruption going on, the anti–
corruption war would never end. It would always be part of the everyday life.  
 
In the period of socialist reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping, in view of the anti–
corruption struggle that the Party had carried out and the experience and lessons 
learned, systematically summarized and put forward a series of important theoretical 
viewpoints.  
 
First, Deng analyzed the errors the Party had been making ever since the day the CPC 
claimed authority over the country, especially the ones during the time of the ―Cultural 
Revolution‖, and found out that the ―root cause‖ to the ―unique socialist bureaucratism‖ 
(ibid.2009) that the country was experiencing was closely related to the highly 
centralization that the government was practicing. The leading organs at all levels had 
too much control over the things that were far out of their reach, which in turn led to the 
passive attitude towards doing their job properly as well as to corrupt behavior. Here 
Deng boldly pointed the analytical spearhead to the existing leadership system.  
 
He pointed out that the over–concentration of power means inappropriate and 
indiscriminate concentration of all power in Party committees in the name of 
strengthening centralized Party leadership. Moreover, the power of the Party 
committees themselves is often in the hands of a few secretaries, especially the first 
secretaries, who direct and decide everything. Thus the ―centralized Party leadership‖ 
often turns into leadership by individuals. And he believed that the prolonged lack of 
appreciation regarding this issue was the main reason for ―Cultural Revolution‖ to take 
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place, and for which China had paid a really heavy price. Therefore, he raised the major 
task of reforming the Party and state leadership system. 
 
Second, Deng summed up the lesson of the overspreading ideological trend in favor of 
bourgeois liberalization and the political turmoil in 1989 since the reform and opening 
up and found a master switch on the ideological and political line of defense in the 
battle of fighting against corruption which was the strict adherence to the ideological 
education of hard work. He concluded that ―Our biggest mistake was in education, we 
got weaker in ideological and political work‖ since the reform and opening up. ―The 
most important mistake is that we fail to inform the people, including Communist Party 
members that we should maintain the tradition of hard work under the circumstances 
that the economy has been prosperously developing, and people‘s living standards have 
greatly improved‖ and ―adhering to this tradition, is the crucial element of winning 
anti–corruption war.‖ (ibid.2009.) So what he advocated was that the government 
should firmly grasp this master switch in the ideological education of hard work, in 
order to withstand the erosion of corruptive phenomenon towards Party and people‘s 
political power.  
 
Third, he summed up the lessons learned from the unevenly distributed attention 
towards economic construction and clean government construction since China started 
the reform and opening up and put forward a solution to correctly handle the 
relationship between the two as what called the ―Three Favorable‖ which refer to 
―whether it is conducive to the development of socialist social productive forces, 
whether it helps strengthen the socialist country's comprehensive national strength, and 
whether it helps improve people‘s living standards‖ (ibid.2009). The construction of 
economy and clean government should obey the rules mentioned above in order to serve 
the purpose of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. This ―three 
favorable‖ cleared out the confusion of how to deal with the relationship between the 
two. 
 
Fourth, he summed up the experiences and drew the necessary lessons from clean 
government construction and anti–corruption in the period of reforming and opening up 
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that our Party had carried out, and put forward the overall strategy of the fight against 
corruption under the conditions of reforming and opening up and the construction of 
socialist market economic system. That is to fight against corruption through education, 
the legal system and the development and reform. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that 
―education‖ means to give the ideological and political education of hard work to the 
Party members, cadres and people. He also pointed out that the ―legal‖ includes law, 
institution, system, management and many other elements. Deng Xiaoping made a 
special emphasis on development and reform. He thought that the problems occurred 
during the construction of clean government and anti–corruption often lined to the level 
of economic development of the local government as well as the deficiency of the 
system. Therefore, ―pushing the economy forward is the permanent cure‖. His theory of 
overall development and comprehensive reform pointed out the direction for us even 
today of how to build a clean government and fight against corruption. (ibid.2009.) 
 
Throughout the anti–corruption history of China since 1949, it is unmistakable that the 
Chinese government does take anti–corruption seriously and considers it one of the 
crucial factors of consolidating political power, stabilizing the social environment and 
promoting the development of socialism. However, before The Third Plenary Session of 
the 11th Central Committee, the anti–corruption usually were carried out in the form of 
campaign like the ―Three Antis‖ which was effective in the period of times when it was 
launched but did not have a profound long–term influence regarding the issue of anti–
corruption let alone solving the problem. Moreover, the campaign–styled anti–
corruption, in some degree, often mixed with ―rule of man‖ not ―rule of law‖ which 
often resulted in ignoring or even trampling on democracy and the legal system.  
 
After the Third Plenary Session, Chinese government under the head of Deng Xiaoping 
realized the limitation of the previous anti–corruption approaches and started to learn 
from these lessons and experiences and determined that the right road leading to anti–
corruption was the ―rule of law‖. China enacted its fist systematic Criminal Law, in 
which the specific provisions of the offence of corruption and bribery were made in 
1979. Then in 1982 and 1989, the Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Who 
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Have Seriously Sabotaged the Economy and the Supplementary Decision on Punishing 
the Offence of Corruption and Bribery were issued.  
 
In the 1990s, however, with the booming market economy, the corruption situation in 
China was made worse by the lack of balanced monitoring power in the period of 
transforming the planned economy into the socialist market economy. Major corruption 
cases increased year by year. From 1984 to 1988, the number of corruption–suspected 
cadres in county level was only 10 000, not much in the number of bureau–level cadres, 
and almost none in the provincial level. From 1989 to 1993, 30 000 in county level, the 
number of offender had reached 173 in bureau–level cadres and five provincial level 
cadres were involved in the corruption cases which showed an growing trend of 
officials getting corrupted. Judging from the amount of money involved in the 
corruption cases, from 1984 to 1988, million–Yuan cases were scarce, from 1989 to 
1993, only 81cases million Yuan involved, and since 1993, cases with more than 
million Yuan involved has increased rapidly. (ibid.2009.) 
 
In general, after the reform and opening up policy, corruption in China has a close 
relationship with the contradictions and conflicts occurred during the transition period 
of the national economy system, and can be divided into four stages: the first cycle was 
between the years 1980–1988. In 1980, China just started the reform and opening up 
policy, and the interest differentiation of society was not in full swing, so the number of 
corruption cases and the amount of money and cadres involved were relatively small. 
However, with the gradually deepened interest differentiation and reforming process, 
the numbers of corruption cases were increasing and, in about 1986, reached the first 
peak. After that, this trend began to fall back due to the attention people began to put on 
corruption and the construction of a clean and honest administration that was 
strengthened. In1988, the first stage ended. In the first cycle, there were peaks and 
troughs, though the overall trend showed an upward development, compared to the 
upcoming cycles, the number was small and manageable. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 
2004.) 
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1988–1992 was the second cycle of corruption. The pace of reforming was accelerated 
and special approaches were carried out such as the double–track price system, which 
was a special price management system that helped with the transformation from the 
Chinese planned economy into the socialist market economy. This system meant that 
the same product can have two different prices. If the quota of the product was met 
according to the state plan, then the manufacture can sell the rest of the product with the 
price determined by the market. The downside of this approach was that it opened the 
door to corruption and made corruption an easy job with low risks and in 1989 reached 
the second climax. With the enhanced efforts of the government on anti–corruption, the 
situation remained under control. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.) 
 
1992–1998 was the third cycle of corruption. In 1990s, the corruption began to take 
place in the fields of financial, securities and transfer of property rights and the amount 
of money involved in these corruption cases were far more than previous ones. And 
because of the lag of the system construction and the special nature of gradually–
advanced reform, it is safe to say that corruption situation in this period of time was the 
most serious with its peak in 1997. In the same year later, China‘s anti–corruption 
strategy had a significant change, from treating the symptoms by investigating major 
cases to focusing on addressing both the symptoms and root cause by emphasizing the 
ideological education and other measures to control corruption from the source. This 
new approach achieved a desirable result that led to the rapid decline on the number of 
corruption cases in 1998. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.) 
 
1998–2002, China entered the fourth corruption cycle. The number of corruption cases 
showed a gradually increasing trend, but the growth rate was limited. Moreover, since 
China had established an institutionalized anti–corruption approach, the fluctuating 
range of corruption decreased significantly. In this stage, the total number of corruption 
cases and cadres involved in them dropped dramatically compared to the previous 
examples, showing that corruption in general was more effectively controlled. However, 
the numbers of major corruption cases, the amount of money and county–level and 
above cadres involved in were increasing significantly, exceeding the former cases 
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indicated that major corruption cases and high–level official corruption became a 
serious problem in society. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.) 
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4. THE CORRUPTION AND ANTI–CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE 
 
Singapore, located in the north–east Asia, is a country formed by several islands. 
According to government statistics, the population of Singapore as of 2008 was 4.8 
million, of whom 3.6 million were Singapore citizens and permanent residents. Various 
Chinese linguistic groups formed 76.7% of Singapore's residents, Malays 14%, Indians 
7.9%, while Eurasians, Arabs and other groups formed 1.4%. (Focus Singapore.) 
 
Singapore is effectively a multi–racial, multi–cultural and multi–lingual nation, the 
government recognizes four official languages: English, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay 
and Tamil. 
 
Mandarin (Chinese) is spoken widely in Singapore. Mandarin‘s use has spread largely 
as a result of government–sponsored public campaigns and efforts to support its 
adoption and use over other Chinese dialects. It is generally spoken as a common 
language amongst Singapore‘s Chinese community. Most Singapore Chinese are, 
however, descended from immigrants who came from the southern regions of China 
where other dialects were spoken, such as Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka and 
Hainanese. (Country Studies 2007.) 
 
Malay and Tamil are seldom spoken in Singapore even though they are the official 
languages. It is quite common for Singaporeans to speak English for formal occasions 
like in work place and Chinese for informal, everyday life. Singapore is the only other 
country except China in the world that the majority of the population is of Chinese 
origins and uses Chinese for communication. (Country Studies 2007.) 
 
The first record of settlement in Singapore are from the second century AD, Some of the 
earliest records of this region are the reports of Chinese officials who served as envoys 
to the seaports and empires of the Nanyang (southern ocean), the Chinese term for 
Southeast Asia. The earliest first–hand account of Singapore appears in a geographical 
handbook written by the Chinese traveler Wang Dayuan in 1349. Wang noted that 
Singapore Island, which he called Tan–ma–hsi (Danmaxi), was a haven for several 
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hundred boatloads of pirates who preyed on passing ships. He also described a 
settlement of Malay and Chinese living on a terraced hill known in Malay legend as 
Bukit Larangan (Forbidden Hill), the reported burial place of ancient kings. The 
fourteenth–century Javanese chronicle, the Nagarakertagama, also noted a settlement on 
Singapore Island, calling it Temasek. (Country Studies 2007.) 
 
From above mentioned historical materials and statistics, it is easy to conclude that 
Singapore has a profound relationship with China, and culturally speaking, both 
Singapore and China are influenced deeply by the Confucian culture. Singapore has a 
long history of Chinese migration. At least from the Ming Dynasty, since 14
th
 century, 
China has a clear historical record of people living in Singapore. Although the recorded 
Chinese migration to Singapore was mostly consisted with the under–educated labor 
workers, they were drenched in the Confucian culture ever since their childhood and 
grew up in environment under that influence. It is inevitable that they would bring this 
culturally influenced ideology and traditions as well as the codes of conduct into the 
new environment they emigrated to, and with the wide spread and fast growth of the 
Chinese migrant population, Chinese culture was gradually infiltrated into the native 
culture. 
 
Singapore has a quite tortuous history towards independence because its strategic 
geographic position. Singapore had been the colony of Britain for 143 years from 1819 
to 1942, then directly after, from 1942 to 1945 was under the Japanese domination. 
After the Second World War, the Japanese were defeated and Singapore was back to 
British hands but after all the turbulence Singapore and its people had been through, the 
colonial status of the country was not welcomed by Singaporeans anymore, and they 
were struggling to fight for the day that they could be independent from any other 
country.  
 
The year between 1945 and 1962 was this struggling period, during which time the 
Communist Party of Malaya was trying to take over the sovereign power of the country 
and led Singapore to declare the state of emergency for 12 years, and eventually 
resulted in the amendment of the Singapore constitution which empowered Singapore 
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with more independence. Finally in 1959, Singapore gained its complete independence, 
and then in 1963 joined the Federation of Malaysia. However, the conflicts in the 
ideology of ruling the country as well as the political and economical differences 
between Singaporean government and the central government led to Singapore being 
evicted from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. Singapore then joined the United 
Nation on 21
st
 of September the same year and the British Commonwealth of Nations 
later in October for fear of being forced and attacked by Malaysia or Indonesia. 
(Singapore 1994.) 
 
Singapore entered into the new age of developing and ruling the country on its free will. 
And at the beginning of this new age, Singaporean government was facing a tough task 
of saving the country that is dying for all its sufferings. Through hard work and 
insightful guidance by the government, the country was revived and burst with energy 
and prosperity in the 1980s. However, with dramatically increased living standard and 
opened social atmosphere brought by the soaring economic growth, came the ultra–
individualism, hedonism and utilitarianism that spread around the nation swiftly. 
 
Seeing this trend of development in social and cultural aspects, Lee Kuan Yew, the 
Prime Minster of Singapore at that time raised the idea of promoting the Confucian 
Culture at schools so that Singapore would survive from the damage these trends might 
have caused by its rapid economic growth and development. For he believed that the 
Confucian Culture could reinforce the influential power of society and family values 
that would bond people together and ensure a harmonious development. So, traditional 
Chinese culture and values were introduced back to the stage after all the turbulences of 
changing situations of history, and were greatly developed and implemented. 
 
 Singapore started to study the Confucian culture systematically across the country, and 
set up a special research institution–the Institute of East Asia Philosophies in 1983 to 
study the traditional ideas of Confucianism and its modernization and practical role, 
value and function in the current environment. This also led to a worldwide boom in 
Confucian studies, and awakened the Confucian scholars both in eastern and western 
countries to become aware of questions of the continuity and evolvement of 
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Confucianism and the development of its path in modern societies. (East Asian Institute 
2008.) 
 
The fact that both China and Singapore are located in Asia, and that the Chinese culture 
and values were commonly applied in Singapore as well as the fact that Singapore is the 
only other country in the whole world except China that the majority of the population 
speaks Chinese as mentioned above, make it reasonable to conclude that China and 
Singapore share commonalities that make my study conductible for the comparison of 
these two different nations. However, the commonalities are only part of the foundation 
of which I am going to build my research, the differences, which completes the other 
part of my research foundation, is of much more importance. 
 
Other than the obvious and irrelevant differences such as the population, the climate and 
so on, I am focused more on differences that are relevant and significant.         
 
 
Table 1. Ranking of China and Singapore in Corruption Perception Indices 2001–2008. 
(Transparency International 2009). 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 57 59 66 71 78 70 72 72 79 
Singa
pore 
4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 
 
 
From table 1, it is stunning to see that China and Singapore are performing so 
differently in the field of corruption. In 2001, there were 91 countries which participated 
in the survey and by the year of 2009, the numbers of countries in the survey were 
increased to 180. That explains why China ranked a bit higher in 2001 and then went 
straight backwards after that, while Singapore went on steady and even upgraded a little 
under the same circumstances. It is safe to say that Singapore is on the top of the 
countries that have a clean and transparent government whereas China From the year 
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2001 to 2009 averaged 3.425 on a 1–10 scale (the lower the index, the more corrupt a 
country is perceived by its public, domestic entrepreneurs, and overseas investors). 
 
Here is a graph dated from 1995 showing the different rankings of Singapore I selected 
from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau‘s home page. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Corruption Perception Index (1995 to 2005). 
 
 
From figure 2, we can see that Singapore‘s CPI ranking never fell out of top 10 
positions and in the years 1996 and 1997, it showed a backwards tend of rankings from 
3 to 7 and 9, but since 1998, the score was improved every year till now. 
 
The question is now on the table. Why do Singapore and China, the two Asian countries 
that are basically sharing the identical cultural background and have other similar traits 
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perform so differently in the anti–corruption area? I will begin my analysis starting from 
the 1950s when Singapore, like its neighbors, was a place rampant with corruption. 
 
In 1940 and the early 1950, corruption was so commonly accepted by Singaporeans and 
their government that it was considered a part of life and necessary measure to get 
things done in the public or private sectors. S.R. Nathan, the president of Singapore 
once told a little story about him applying for a job in the City Council, and he was 
interviewed by the Indian leader of the Trade Union Congress, during the interview, he 
was asked about a strange question of ―how many tables‖, Nathan was so confused and 
had no idea of how to answer that, and of course he was rejected for the job. It was only 
until later that he found out the strange question that got him jobless was the leader 
asking him how many tables would he book in the local restaurant to thank them if he 
got hired. It is a quite vivid story that reflects the situation in Singapore before the 
People‘s Action Party took charge of the country. Corruption was seen everywhere that 
people actually have to pay the civil servant of the government tip for picking up 
application forms. This period of time is also considered the most corruptive time in 
Singapore‘s history. (Record office of Singapore 2009.) 
 
The reason that corruption was so rife at that time was firstly because the law of 
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was weak since the government just came to 
power.  
 
Secondly, public officers were not as highly paid as compared to those in the private 
sector. Some of them became indebted due to lack of savings to tide them over difficult 
times and some resorted to corruption to make ends meet. (Institutional Arrangements 
to Combat Corruption–A Comparative Study 2005.) 
 
Finally, the population was generally less educated then and did not know their rights. 
As a result, the only way they knew how to get things done was through bribery. 
(Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption–A Comparative Study 2005.) 
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In the years prior to 1952, Singapore had an anti–corruption branch, the one under the 
Singapore Police Force that was in charge of all the corruption cases investigations. The 
thing was that this department did a terrible job of fighting against corruption, 
especially when it came to the corruption concerning police officers. So, in 1952, the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau was established as an independent body 
responsible for the investigation and prevention of corruption in Singapore that was 
directly taking orders from and responsible to the Prime Minister's Office.  
 
The beginning of CPIB was not smooth going due to the incompleteness of the anti–
corruption regulations and laws which made the investigation and collecting evidence 
impossible to accomplish as well as the low confidence and support from the people. To 
complicate matters further, the CPIB officers were drawn from the Singapore Police 
Force and, consequently, not committed to investigating corrupt practices that mainly 
involved their former police colleagues and were therefore not psychologically prepared 
to committing themselves to fighting corruption. Also, being on secondment did not 
provide the officers with adequate protection and security of tenure.  
 
As a result, many officers were reappointed before they were able to conclude their 
investigation. In addition, the public service was prone to corruption due to low skills, 
low salaries and lack of integrity, together with a general culture of supremacy of public 
officers over citizens and related public acceptance of unfair treatment by government 
officials (Ali 2000:3–4). There was also a lack of support among the population as the 
public was skeptical of the effectiveness of the CPIB.  
 
In 1959, when the People‘s Action Party (PAP) that was led by Lee Kuan Yew took 
power in the country, the new government made it an immediate task to minimize 
corruption and make it a high–risk, low–reward activity. In 1960, a comprehensive anti–
corruption strategy was initiated through the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act (POCA).The strategy was based on the principle that ―corruption is caused by both 
the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt‖ thus requiring that both the incentives 
and the opportunities for corruption be removed (Quah 2003:83).  
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Leading by example and a policy of zero–tolerance for corruption were key elements of 
the strategy for changing people‘s attitudes. The POCA also expanded the powers of 
investigation of the CPIB, giving the Bureau the tools it needed to combat corruption, as 
well as increased the punishment for corruption. Strong action were taken against 
corrupt officials and examples were set that showed the government‘s conviction 
concerning the issue of combating corruption and had greatly boosted the confidence 
and support of the public towards CPIB as well as a clear message being sent that the 
law was going to be stringently implemented and that corruption had become a high–
risk, low–reward activity. (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption–A 
Comparative Study 2005.) 
 
The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is an independent body which 
investigates and aims to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors in 
Singapore. Established in 1952, it derives its powers of investigation from the 
Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241). The bureau is headed by a director who is 
directly responsible to the Prime Minister. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
2006a.) 
 
The bureau is responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the public service and 
encouraging corruption–free transactions in the private sector. It is also charged with the 
responsibility of checking on malpractices by public officers and reporting such cases to 
the appropriate government departments and public bodies for disciplinary action. 
Although the primary function of the bureau is to investigate corruption under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, it is empowered to investigate any other sizable offence 
under any written law which is disclosed in the course of a corruption investigation. 
(Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006a.) 
 
Besides bringing corruption offenders to book, the bureau carried out corruption 
prevention by reviewing the work methods and procedures of corruption–prone 
departments and public bodies to identify administrative weaknesses in the existing 
systems which could facilitate corruption and malpractices, and recommends remedial 
and prevention measures to the heads of departments concerned. Also in this regard, 
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officers of the bureau regularly conduct lectures and seminars to educate public officers, 
especially those who come into contact with the public, on the pitfalls of and the 
avoidance of corruption. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006a.) 
 
The functions of the CPIB are:  
 
 to receive and investigate complaints alleging corrupt practices;  
 to investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers with an undertone 
of corruption; and  
 to prevent corruption by examining the practices and procedures in the public 
service to minimize opportunities for corrupt practices. (Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
The organization structure of CPIB 
 
The CPIB is under the charge of the Prime Minister's Office. Organizationally, the 
CPIB has two divisions namely: The Operations Division and The Administration & 
Specialist Support Division  
 
Operations Division. The Operations Division executes the main function of the Bureau 
in investigating offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It comprises 4 
investigation units, one of which is the elite Special Investigation Team (SIT) which 
handles the more complex and major cases. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
2006b.) 
 
Completed investigation papers are submitted to the Public Prosecutor based on the 
available evidence. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, no prosecution can be 
instituted except by or with the written consent of the Public Prosecutor. (Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
Cases against public officers with insufficient evidence to support a court prosecution 
are referred (with the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor) to the head of the 
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department concerned for disciplinary action. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
2006b.) 
 
An Intelligence Department was established under the Operations Division. It gathers 
and collates intelligence to support the investigation needs of the Operations Division. 
(Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
Administration & Specialist Support Division. The Administration & Specialist Support 
Division has fore units which are:  
 Administration Unit is responsible for corporate and investigation support 
services, including registry, finance, procurement and personnel matters. 
 Prevention & Review Unit carries out reviews of the work procedures of 
corruption–prone government departments to identify the administrative 
weaknesses, which could facilitate corruption and malpractices, and thereafter 
recommends appropriate preventive measures. 
 Computer Information System Unit undertakes computerization projects and 
develops application systems to manage the records and enhance the 
effectiveness of the Operations Division. 
 Plans & Project Unit undertakes various staff work relating to planning projects, 
operations support and policies. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
It is commonly recognized that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, after Lee 
Kuan Yew and his PAP took charge of the country, played a vital role of saving 
Singapore from the dark and degenerated time of corruption and transforming it into 
one of the world‘s most effective countries that manage to control and restrain 
corruption and maintain a clean and transparent government. Singapore placed 5
th
 out of 
159 countries on Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index 2005. 
However, we should be aware that the success of anti–corruption in Singapore does not 
lie on the CPIB alone. Without the strong and strict anti–corruption laws and 
regulations, the CPIB could never achieve what it achieved.  
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Prevention of Corruption Act  
Chapter 241 
 
The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) was enacted in June 1960, to provide for the 
more effectual prevention of corruption. The law also empowers CPIB officers to 
investigate and arrest corrupt offenders. The PCA was amended a few times since its 
enactment. Through these amendments, punishments for corrupt offenders were 
enhanced and CPIB officers were given more investigative powers to make the fight 
against corruption easier. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.) 
 
Under the PCA, the President may appoint an officer to be the Director of the CPIB. 
The President may also appoint a Deputy Director and such number of assistant 
directors and special investigators of CPIB as he may deem fit. What is commonly 
known as a ―bribe‖ is described as a ―corrupt gratification‖ in the PCA. ―Gratifications‖ 
can take many forms, and they include:  
1. money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property 
or interest in property of any description, whether movable or immovable;  
2. any office, employment or contract;  
3. any payment, release, discharge of liquidation of any loan, obligation or other 
liability whatsoever, whether in whole or in part;  
4. any other service, favor, advantage of any description whatsoever, including 
protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or 
proceedings of a disciplinary or penal nature, whether or not already instituted, and 
including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official 
power or duty; and  
5. any offer, undertaking or promise of any gratification within the meaning of 
paragraphs mentioned above. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c) 
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Under the PCA, an ‗agent‘ means any person employed by or acting for another, and 
includes a trustee, administrator and executor, and a person serving the Government or 
under any corporation or public body, and for the purposes of section 8 of PCA includes 
subcontractor and any person employed by or acting for such subcontractor. On the 
other hand, the ‗principal‘ includes an employer, a beneficiary under a trust, and a trust 
estate as though it were a person and any person beneficially interested in the estate of a 
deceased person as though the estate were a person, and in the case of a person serving 
the Government or a public body includes the Government or the public body, as the 
case may be. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.) 
  
The anti–corruption law has been reviewed regularly to ensure that offenders do not 
escape legal punishment and that corruption does not pay. The amendments to the law 
so far included: 
 empowering the court to order offenders to pay a penalty equal to the amount of 
bribe received apart from punishment in the form of fines and/or imprisonment 
term  
 empowering investigators with wider powers  
 rendering it unnecessary to prove that a person who accepted a bribe was in the 
position to carry out the required favor  
 empowering investigators to order public officers under investigation to furnish 
sworn statements specifying properties belonging to them, their spouses and 
children  
 empowering the public prosecutor to obtain information from the comptroller of 
income tax  
 empowering the court to admit wealth disproportionate to income as 
corroborative evidence  
 empowering the removal of the accomplice rule which views evidence of 
accomplice as unworthy of credit, unless corroborated  
 rendering it a legal obligation to provide information required by investigators of 
the bureau  
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 rendering Singapore citizens to be liable for punishment for corrupt offences 
committed outside Singapore and to be dealt with as if the offences had been 
committed in Singapore  
 creating a new seizable offence of knowingly giving false or misleading 
information (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.) 
The principle that corruption does not pay was further fortified by the enactment of The 
Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act of 1989. This provides the court with powers 
to confiscate the pecuniary resources and property which a person convicted of a 
corruption offence cannot satisfactorily account for. This Act was replaced by the 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes, Confiscation of Benefits Act, 
Chapter 65(A) in 1999. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.) 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act  
Chapter 65(A) 
 
Under Section 13 of the PCA, when a corrupt offender is convicted, the Court shall also 
order him to pay a penalty equivalent to the amount of bribes he received. To further 
make sure that corrupt offenders do not benefit from their criminal conduct, the 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, 
Chapter 65(A) was enacted in 1999 to allow the Court to confiscate properties from 
convicted corrupt offenders, if the said properties are found to be benefits of corruption 
offences. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
The essence of building clean government lies in the prevention from the institutional 
level. In order to prevent corruption from happening, the CPIB constantly sums up the 
loopholes found in the government‘s policy–implementing process during the 
investigation of corruption cases and proposes the specific measures and suggestions 
from the institutional level and the implementation section to prevent corruption. 
Furthermore, the Congress enacted a series of laws and regulations on the behavior of 
the civil servants, including the ―Civil Service Law‖, ―instruction manual and the 
discipline provisions of the Civil Service‖ and so on to restrain and regulate the civil 
servants. Besides laws and regulations, there are also administrative measures of 
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preventing corruption. Several administrative measures were taken to reduce the 
chances of public officers getting involved in corruption and wrongdoings. These 
measures included:  
 replacing seconded police officers with permanent civilian investigators  
 removing opportunity for corruption  
 streamlining administrative procedures  
 slashing down red tape  
 reviewing public officers‘ salaries to ensure that they are paid adequately  
 reminding government contractors at the time of signing that bribing public 
officers administering the contract can lead to termination of contract (Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
Also, various preventive measures are in place to reduce opportunities for corruption 
particularly in the public service that include the following content: 
 
Declaration of Non–Indebtedness. Every public officer is required to declare once a 
year that he is free from pecuniary embarrassment. An indebted public officer could 
easily place himself under obligation and be exploited. He is also more likely to 
succumb to corruption. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
Declaration of Assets and Investments. Every public officer is required to declare, when 
he is first appointed and subsequently annually, his properties and investments in 
companies, including those of his spouse and dependent children. If the officer owns 
more than one property that is not in keeping with his salary earnings, he could be 
queried on how he could have the means to purchase them. If he owns some shares in 
private companies, he could be asked to divest ownership to prevent a conflict of 
interest. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
Other than the detailed classification of bribery under the ―Prevention of Corruption 
Act‖, the definition of ―receive remuneration‖ covers a very broad range from money, 
gifts, securities, properties and any kind of interest to positions, employment or contract 
and support, relieve, release, discharge of any loans, debt; it also includes any services, 
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favors and benefits, such as providing protections to be free of punishment, discipline, 
litigation and so on as well as a variety of implementation delays; it even includes the 
commitments or promises regarding to the above mentioned remuneration.  
 
The accepting of gifts of the Singapore civil servant is also included in the scope of 
suspected corruption, and is strictly regulated: First, the civil servant may not accept any 
gifts, money or other benefits, such as entertainment or free travel and etc. from the 
public; second, the civil servant, except in case of retirement, shall not accept gifts or 
entertainment from subordinates.  
 
If to accept the gifts presented by subordinates because of retirement, then he/she must 
write a report to the head of the department to declare the value of the received gifts 
etc.; the value of the received gift should not exceed 300 dollars; third, if one cannot 
refuse or reject the gifts under the special circumstances, then he/she may temporarily 
keep the gift, and report and hand over the gift to the head of the department afterwards. 
The officer, however, can retain the gift if he/she pays for it at the value assessed by the 
Accountant–General; fourth, if to accept the entertainment activity offered by 
subordinate officers, he/she must report the time and place of the activity, the activity 
must be appropriate and cannot cost more than 2% of the subordinate office‘s monthly 
wage. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)  
 
Singapore does not take the death penalty as a way to deter and stop corruption, but 
considers the confiscating of property and imprisonment to be the most severe and 
effective punishment. In Singapore any person who is convicted of a corruption offence 
can be fined up to 100,000 Singapore dollars, or sentenced to imprisonment of up to 
five years or to both. If the offence relates to a government contract or involves a 
Member of Parliament or a member of a public body, the term of imprisonment can be 
increased to seven years. Besides the fine and imprisonment, a person convicted of a 
corruption offence will be ordered by the court to return the amount of the bribe he had 
accepted in the form of penalty. In addition, the court is also empowered to confiscate 
the property and pecuniary resources which a convicted person cannot satisfactorily 
account for. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
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Section 8 of PCA is a presumption section which states: ―Where in any proceedings 
against a person under section 5 or 6, it is proved that any gratification has been paid or 
given to or received by a person in the employment of the Government or any 
department thereof or of a public body by or from a person or agent of a person who has 
or seeks to have any dealings with Government or any department thereof or any public 
body, that gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received 
corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is 
proved.‖ This effectively shifts the burden to the corrupt offender, who has to prove to 
the Court that the gratification involved is not given or received corruptly. (Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
A corrupt public officer may be charged in court if there is enough evidence to do so, or 
he may be dealt with through departmental disciplinary procedures if there is 
insufficient evidence for court prosecution. A public officer charged in court for 
corruption will also lose his job and if he is pensionable, his pension and other benefits. 
As for departmental disciplinary action, the punishment may include: dismissal from 
service; reduction in rank; stoppage or deferment of salary increment; fine or reprimand; 
retirement in public interest. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.) 
 
Tan Kia Gan, then Minister for National Development, was investigated in August 1966 
for attempting to help his close businessman friend Lim Tjin Hauw and his son William 
Lim to clinch the sale of Boeing aircraft to Malaysian Airways. He also acted as an 
intermediary for his brother–in–law in the sale of a tin mine to Lim. For this, he was 
given 70,000 shares worth $1 each. As the witnesses did not want to implicate him, Tan 
Kia Gan was administratively stripped of all his public appointments by the 
Government. Teh Cheang Wan, then Minister for National Development, was 
investigated in 1986 for accepting 2 bribes totaling $1 million from Hock Tat 
Development Pte Ltd and Ho Yeow Koon of Keck Seng Pte Ltd in 1981 and 1982 
respectively. Hock Tat Development had paid Teh a gratification of $500,000 after he 
helped the company to retain a piece of land that was earmarked for acquisition by the 
Government. Ho Yeow Koon had also given a gratification of $500,000 to Teh for 
helping to buy over a piece of State land for private development. Teh committed 
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suicide before he could be formally charged in court. (Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau 2006d.) 
 
Since corruption is caused by both the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt, the 
integrated legal system that includes both the preventive measures and severe 
punishment has succeeded in reducing the possible corruption opportunities and deter 
the public officers from being corrupted. Beside the effective CPIB and the integrated 
legal system, the government leaders‘ determination to fight against corruption is also a 
key element that leads to the clean government.  
 
After Independence in 1965, the new political leaders took it upon themselves to set 
good examples for public officers to follow by divesting themselves from financial and 
commercial ties and by working harder than their subordinates. In 1979, Mr. Lee Kuan 
Yew, then Prime Minister of Singapore stated: ―The moment key leaders are less than 
incorruptible, less than stern in demanding high standards, from that moment the 
structure of administrative integrity will weaken, and eventually crumble. Singapore can 
survive only if ministers and senior officers are incorruptible and efficient... Only when 
we uphold the integrity of the administration can the economy work in a way which 
enables Singaporeans to clearly see the nexus between hard work and high rewards. 
Only then will people, foreigners and Singaporeans, invest in Singapore; only then will 
Singaporeans work to improve themselves and their children through better education 
and further training, instead of hoping for windfalls through powerful friends and 
relatives or greasing contacts in the right places.‖ (Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau 2006d.) 
 
The Singapore example of successfully curbing corruption is always considered a 
miracle and is greatly promoted in China. It is believed by most Chinese that the 
Singaporean way of anti–corruption is the ultimate answer to China‘s deteriorated 
corruption problem. And more than 30 years ago, China started to study and analyze the 
Singaporean experience at home as well as send investigation groups to Singapore to 
obtain the first–hand information hoping that it would help with the Chinese corruptive 
situation, some even went so far as to suggest that China should copy the measures such 
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as building the anti–corruption bureau in China or implementing the high salary 
approach because they are proven useful in Singapore.  
 
However, those who think that China can just copy and paste whatever works in 
Singapore, they were mistaken. They only see what is on the surface but not what is 
within. To achieve what Singapore had achieved, we have to see through the appearance 
to perceive the essence. Just like the Establishment of the Chinese anti–corruption 
bureau. China took the form of CPIB but not the essence of it. 
 
The greater investigative powers and deterrent terms against the corrupt under the 
revamped legislation would be futile if not buttressed by effective enforcement action. 
―The CPIB strikes fear in the hearts of many Singaporeans, especially those bent on 
corrupt activities. In the words of an observer, ‗In Singapore bureaucracy, the CPIB is 
feared as the PAP‘s leadership‘s all–seeing eye, and respected for its near clockwork 
efficiency and its sophisticated operational methods.‘ The CPIB‘s formidable name in 
Chinese is ‗Foul Greed Investigation Bureau‘.‖ (Quah 1978). 
 
Although the CPIB is responsible to the Prime Minister‘ Office, with its own 
independent and complete investigative powers, it can start the investigation against the 
government ministers, parliamentarians and other high level officials, even the senior 
members of the People‘s Action Party that are suspected of corruption without reporting 
to the Prime Minister to get the consent. Of course, as a department under the heads of 
Prime Minister's Office, the director of CPIB must keep the Prime Minister updated and 
brief him with the proceedings of the ongoing investigation, but such briefings shall not 
affect the independence of the investigation the bureau is conducting.  
 
The distinguished feature of CPIB is that it has the completely independent and 
integrated investigative power which is similar to FBI, Scotland Yard and other 
independent secret investigative police forces. Notably, the anti–corruption agencies 
that have the independent and integrated investigative power like CPIB and ICAC 
(Independent Commission against Corruption) in Hong Kong are not commonly seen in 
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the world, and both regions are securing a successful and promising performance in the 
battle against corruption compared to the rest of the world.  
 
The internal relations between the independent power and the superior performance in 
anti–corruption cannot be ignored or overlooked. In order to ensure the CPIB‘S 
achievement on anti–corruption, Singapore has repeatedly revised and improved the 
―Prevention of Corruption Act‖ and other laws, so that the corruption Investigation 
Bureau can independently exercise their powers to execute their duties without the 
interference from the police force or other state departments.   
 
All special investigators of CPIB are issued with certificates of appointment (similar to 
the warrant cards used by some local law enforcement agencies). CPIB officers may 
exercise the following powers of investigation: 
 
 Powers of Arrest under Section 15 of the PCA 
The Director or any special investigator may without a warrant arrest any person who 
has been concerned in any offence under this Act or against whom a reasonable 
complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable 
suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. The Director or a special investigator 
arresting a person may search such person and take possession of all articles found upon 
him which there is reason to believe were the fruits or other evidence of the crime, 
provided that no female shall be searched except by a female. Every person so arrested 
shall be taken to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau or to a police station. 
(Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
  Powers of Investigation under Section 17 of the PCA 
In cases relating to the commission: of an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code, 
or under sections 213, 214 and 215 of the Penal Code, or of any conspiracy to commit, 
or of any attempt to commit, or of any abetment of such an offence; of an offence under 
this Act; or of any sizable offence under any written law which may be disclosed in the 
course of an investigation under this Act. CPIB officer is empowered to exercise all or 
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any of the powers in relation to police investigations into any offence given by the 
Criminal Procedure Code. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
 Powers of Search and Seizure under Section 22 of the PCA 
Director, CPIB may, by warrant directed to any CPIB officer, empower them to enter 
any place by force if necessary and to search, seize and detain any document, article or 
property relating to the commission of any corruption offence, or a conspiracy/attempt 
to commit or an abetment of any such offence. If the CPIB officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that any delay in obtaining the search warrant is likely to frustrate the 
object of the search, he may exercise the powers of search mentioned above without a 
search warrant. (Corrupt practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.) 
 
China‘s anti–corruption agencies have been developed for 20 years, in which contained 
three stages: the first stage was the launch of a pilot project in local government. In 
1989, the first Anti–Corruption Bureau was set up in Guangdong Province under the 
Guangdong Provincial People‘s Procuratorate; the second stage was the establishment 
of General Bureau of Anti–corruption and Bribery under the Supreme People‘s 
Procuratorate in November 1995; the third stage was the establishment of Anti–
Corruption Bureau under all levels the Procuratorates nationwide.  
 
The main task of the anti–corruption bureau at all levels is to undertake investigation or 
detection of corruption offences. If the investigated is proven guilty of corruption 
offences after the investigation, prosecution is made by the public prosecution 
department of the Procurator and then sentenced by the court of justice. Chapter VIII 
(Graft and Bribery) of Criminal Law of the People‘s Republic of China provisions that 
Anti–Corruption Bureau all levels is responsible for the detection or investigation of 
following offences: corruption, embezzlement of public funds, accepting bribes, 
offering bribes, introducing bribes, large amount of properties with unidentified sources, 
concealing of the offshore deposits, illegal possession of state assets and confiscated 
properties.  
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In order to investigate and handle the above mentioned corruption offences, Anti–
Corruption Bureau at all levels can exercise the following six major powers: first, to 
collect and identify the facts of the case and obtain the necessary documentary evidence, 
material evidence; second, to question witnesses and suspects; third, to inquire, freeze 
bank deposits and accounts; forth, to search the body, procession, home and other 
places of the suspected offenders and those who are suspected of withholding the 
evidence and detain the related articles and documents, mail, telegram, etc.; fifth, to 
investigate and examine the places, articles, people etc. related to the offence; sixths, to 
carry out the coercive measure against the offenders such as summon by force, 
residential surveillance, bail, detention, arrest and so on  in accordance with the law.  
 
In the 20 years of exploration and development, the anti–corruption bureau has achieved 
some results On March 11, 2010, at the first plenary meeting of the Third Session of the 
Fourth National People‘s Congress, Cao Jianming, attorney–general of the Supreme 
People‘s Procuratorate revealed in the Work Report of the Supreme People‘s 
Procuratorate that the Supreme People‘s Procuratorate had put on record and 
investigated 32, 429 cases of taking advantage of duty, among which 18, 191 cases were 
major cases involved with corruption; 3175 cases of severe malfeasance, 2670 county–
leveled cadres, 204 bureau–leveled cadres and 8 provincial leveled cadres were 
investigate and dealt with accordingly. From these figures mentioned above, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the anti–corruption bureau had played an important part on 
anti–corruption.  
 
However, despite the result the bureau had achieved, China still faces the challenges of 
improving the case–handling quality of the anti–corruption bureau as well as the grim 
corruption situation. The reasons to these challenges are complicated not only because 
of the mechanisms, but also the constraint from the lack of qualified human resources. 
But the fundamental reason is the constraint from the current employed mechanism.  
 
Below is a demonstration of one survey conducted online about the public‘s perception 
on the Chinese anti–corruption bureau. The survey is between the anti−corruption 
agencies in Mainland China and Hong Kong.   
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Table 2. How trustworthy is the Chinese anti–corruption bureau considered by people? 
(Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007). 
 
Options Keys Number of 
answers 
Percentage 
of answers 
Graph 
100%  40 4% 
 
80–99%  120 11% 
60–79%  221 21% 
30–59%  225 21% 
10–29%  157 15% 
1–9%  62 6% 
Just another 
corrupted 
organ 
 229 21% 
 
 
Table 3. How many divisions do you know there are in Chinese anti–corruption bureau? 
(Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007). 
  
Options Keys Number of 
answers 
percentage 
of answers 
Graph 
Don‘t know  523 49% 
 
Similar to CPIB  164 15% 
The bureau is only 
fighting corruption 
not preventing it 
 166 15% 
Same as above and 
failed to teach 
people not to be 
corrupted 
 202 19% 
Don‘t want to 
know, it is useless 
 3 0% 
Too many and none 
is doing their job 
 15 1% 
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Table 4. How many points does the Chinese anti–corruption bureau get in general 
sense? (Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007). 
Options Keys Number 
of 
answers 
Percentage 
of answers 
Graph 
100  28 3% 
 
80–99  82 8% 
60–79  211 20% 
40–59  240 22% 
20–39  177 16% 
1–19  136 13% 
0  141 13% 
 
 
From table two, we can see that people‘s attitude towards the trustworthiness of the 
anti–corruption bureau is quite different. 221 people think that the bureau is 60–79% 
trustworthy which takes one fifth of the total number of answers, another one fifth of 
the people who answered the survey think that it is 30–59% trustworthy and 229 people 
consider the bureau completely untrustworthy and see it as another corrupted organ. 
Majority of the answerers hold a negative attitude towards the bureau, which suggests 
that the bureau failed to build its reputation among the public.  
 
Table three shows that the structure of the anti–corruption bureau remains a secret to 
almost half of the people who answered the questionnaire. It is no wonder that the 
people in China have absolutely no idea about the anti–corruption bureau since there is 
little information about it. Only in newspapers, could the people see the mentioning of 
the anti–corruption bureau and its working performance in figures. The information 
about how the bureau is working, how it is structured and what the functions of its 
divisions are remain unknown to the public.   
 
Table four indicates that up to 64% of answerers think that the Chinese anti–corruption 
bureau scored unfavorably in general sense in the 0–100 scale. However, 20% of the 
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answerers reckon that it is above average means that there still are people in China who 
believe in the bureau and recognize its effort on fight against corruption which shows 
that the bureau is not a complete disaster. 
 
The lack of independence and supervision of the anti–corruption bureau in China will 
make the bureau another bureaucratic agency with no credibility and integrity among 
the public if the adjustment such as separating the anti–corruption bureau from the 
Procuratorial system to ensure the anti–corruption agencies and the current 
administrative system cannot be assured. 
 
Check and balance of power 
 
One reason that Singapore succeeded in curbing corruption is because of the 
cooperation and division of labor between the CPIB, Attorney–General‘s Chambers and 
the District Courts according to different jurisdiction. While the Bureau has the main 
responsibility for investigating cases of corruption, the Attorney–General, appointed by 
the President on the advice of the Prime Minister (Article 35[1] of the Constitution), is 
also the Public Prosecutor and, as such, is vested with the power to institute, conduct or 
discontinue proceedings for any offence (Article 35[8] of the Constitution).  
 
The Attorney–General is independent in this role and not subject to the control of the 
government. The Attorney–General heads the Attorney–General‘s Chambers of 
Singapore, which is divided into five divisions. Of these, the Criminal Justice Division 
is the organizational extension of the Attorney–General‘s role as Public Prosecutor and, 
as such, advises on and prosecutes criminal cases as well as exercises the Attorney–
General‘s control and direction of criminal prosecutions by directing law enforcement 
agencies in their investigations. In order for a prosecution to be instituted based on an 
investigation conducted by the CPIB, the consent of the Public Prosecutor must be 
sought (POCA, Section 33).  
 
In addition to this, the Public Prosecutor can grant the Director and special investigators 
of the CPIB or any police at or above the rank of assistant superintendent special 
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powers of investigation, including investigating bank and other types of accounts 
(POCA, Subsection 18[1]) as well as, by order, authorize the CPIB to exercise the 
powers of a police investigation in the case of any type of offence (POCA, Section 19). 
The Public Prosecutor also has the power to order the inspection, by the CBIP, of 
bankers‘ books (also of the spouse, children or others who may have acted as his/her 
agent) (POCA, Subsection 20[1]). Section 21 gives the Public Prosecutor further powers 
to request information on the resources and property of the accused and his/her family 
and associates, including ordering the Comptroller of Income Tax to provide any 
information on offenders that it has in its possession (POCA, Section 21). Offences 
under the POCA fall under the jurisdiction of the District Courts, which try the cases 
and determine punishment following a conviction (POCA, Section 34). 
 
The POCA further provides that, during any trial or inquiry by a court into an offence 
under the POCA, the failure of an accused person to account for acquisition of resources 
or property shall be seen as corroborating that the accused has made these acquisitions 
through corrupt practices (Subsection 24[1]). When a defendant is convicted of a 
serious offence, the court shall, on the application of the Public Prosecutor, issue a 
confiscation order of any means which are considered to have been acquired through 
criminal activity (CBA, Subsection 5[1]). （ Institutional Arrangements to Combat 
Corruption–A Comparative Study 2005.） 
 
From above, it is clear that although CPIB is independent with the power of 
investigation, arrest and search and seizure, in order to make sure that its power is 
appropriately used and counterbalanced, two measures are carried out: first, the CPIB 
does not have the right of prosecution and conviction of the suspected offenders. 
Prosecution is done by the Attorney–General‘s Chambers, while the conviction is done 
by the courts. Therefore, the rate of successful prosecution and conviction is the goal 
that the CPIB is chasing after. From 2000 to 2004, the CPIB is responsible for the rate 
of cases being convicted as high as 96.7%, 94.8%, 99.1%, 98.7% and 97.1% 
respectively. Second, if the corruption occurs within the bureau and the staff is 
suspected of corruption, the investigation, although also carried out by the CPIB, the 
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involving officer must be suspended as well as the director of the bureau. (The 23
rd
 
study group of party school of the CPC to Singapore 2008.) 
 
Another approach that caught the attention of the Chinese is what is called the High 
Salary Nourishing a Clean Government approach in China. It is believed by some 
people that this approach is responsible for building the clean government in Singapore 
since the prime Minister and ministers in Singapore government have the world‘s 
highest annual salary and the Singapore government is one of the cleanest governments 
in the world, and that it is absolutely going to be helpful in China as well. The reason 
that they deem the approach useful is as follows: 
  
The previous planned economy systems that China had for almost 30 years had led to 
the egalitarianism which constrains people‘s motivation of performing better and more 
efficient, the complete equality in every level of the society makes it no different of how 
well you do. Everyone was getting the same pay no matter of self–performance had 
made people lose the spirit of compete and being outstanding that also made people 
disappointed and dissatisfied about their jobs. When the monthly pay is fixed and not 
satisfying, it is normal for people with the recourses to look for other ways for more 
material compensations by illegal conducts such as accept briberies, misuse of public 
fund, nepotism and so on so that they can maximize their profit while have the power to 
do so. So the approach of nourishing a clean government by high salary has its positive 
effect, and, to some extent, will help to resist the corruption. 
 
The high salary for nourishing a clean government also manifests a concept of the 
prevention of corruption, the idea of preventing job–related crimes which is quite 
important when fighting corruption. If the government only takes actions after 
corruption has happened and not paying any attention on preventing them from 
happening, the situation would never be improved. People tend to focus on the anti–
corruption afterwards instead of preventing corruption beforehand. The war against 
corruption is not something that can be done in the short period of time but in a long 
run, if the government can provide a clean environment so that the actions of corruption 
would never have the opportunity to occur in the first place, it would be much easier for 
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us to see the progress that have been made about anti–corruption then only punishing 
the corrupted public servants after been exposed. 
 
As said above, the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean government is, to 
some extent, expediency with positive effect on fighting corruption. It respects the 
human nature of being an economic man struggling for what is best for them, which is 
quite human, and it focuses on the prevention of the corruption rather than just thinking 
of a countermeasure after the corruption has been done. In these senses, the approach of 
high salary for nourishing a clean government is a very unique and advanced solution 
for mitigating the serious situation of corruption in the public sector in China. 
 
Before any conclusions are drawn, let‘s go back to the source where this approach 
comes from and take a good look at the reality in Singapore.  
 
Singapore is world renown for its high salary among the government officials. By the 
year of 2000, the annual salary for the Prime Minister of Singapore was 1.94 million 
Singapore dollars (1 U.S. dollar=1.3 Singapore dollar), Minister is 1.42 million, other 
top officials is about 1.1 million Singapore dollars, Permanent Secretary is 600000–
700000 SGD, middle–ranking officials for a bit over 100 thousands Singapore dollars.  
 
Although it appears that the Prime Minister of Singapore is having the world‘s highest 
annual salary, there are two facts that should be observed: first, the amount of officials 
who get one million dollar annual salary stand a very small proportion of the entire 
public servant population, the estimated number is about 30; second, the salary is all 
that the Singaporean government offers, ministers (including the Prime Minister) are 
not equipped with special transportations or full–time drivers, they have to go to work 
with their own cars, only with grand public events, should they get the free ride from 
the Government sent vehicles. They need to pay taxes, and have no government–
provided pension and medical insurance; everything has to be paid by themselves with 
the government paid salary.  
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If a minister fails in the general election, he loses everything. The salary of Minister 
seems high, but this is all they get. They don‘t have any other income in any forms, nor 
do they have any special treatment. They have to buy the houses in the market just like 
anybody else which is unimaginable in China. According to Singapore‘s overall wealth, 
the material benefit that the Singapore government officials obtain from their positions 
is not huge. The salary standard of the Prime Minister and Minister is calculated 
carefully. It is to take the median salary of six highest occupations such as bankers, 
accountants, engineers, lawyers, local businessmen and senior executives of 
multinational corporations. Therefore, although the salary seems to be extremely high, it 
is in fact matches the development of the nation.  
 
The reason that the senior civil servants, especially senior government officials in 
Singapore enjoy such a high salary is not because the government believes that it 
nourishes a clean government, but because it is a strategy to attract and retain qualified 
personnel both from abroad and at home and to keep the talented personnel to willingly 
offer a long–term service in the government. As a matter of fact, in Singapore, the 
―clean government‖ appeared before the ―high salary‖.  
 
During the time of British colonial, the public servants were having favorable salaries 
but the corruption was no way near controlled. After the independence of Singapore, 
facing the troubled national economy and the depraved corruption situation, Lee Kuan 
Yew decided to lower the civil servants‘ salary so that they could strive with the people 
to overcome the difficulties together. It is only after the take–off of the national 
economy in 1973, 8 years later, that the salary of the public officials was gradually 
increased. (Cai Dingjian 2009.) 
Now the truth has been told, we can be aware that the high salary does not necessarily 
lead to the clean government. But as a measure to attract and hold on the talented people 
to work for the government so that everyone could benefit from it, it is important for the 
Chinese government to employ this approach to somehow improve the current 
corruption situation. However, if China really determines to do so, then the following 
considerations must be taken into account beforehand in order to avoid yet another 
disappointment of the Singaporean experience: 
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First, the increasing of the salary of the public servant concerns the interest of many 
sensitive aspects of society, in which sense cannot be achieved immediately but 
gradually and step by step. Gradual process in fact is a continuous exploration and 
learning, continuous feedback and testing process. Policy makers must adjust the policy 
objectives to achieve satisfactory results based on the existing conditions and means and 
drawing on the previous knowledge and experiences. The gradual reform is conducive 
to social stability, and can avoid significant risks and serious mistakes brought by 
policy–induced changes before any major losses. 
 
Second, Salary increase must be parallel with institutional reform in order to improve 
the incentive mechanism through competition by increased wages. Redundancy 
problem that the Chinese government is facing now is yet another obstacle to civil 
servants‘ pay rise because with such a huge number of staff in the system, it is 
extremely difficult to increase the average income of the public servants. By the year 
2002, there were about 8 million civil servants in China, if they are paid 200 RMB more 
for each one of them on a monthly basis, it would be 1.6 billion extra expenses every 
month for the central government (Cai Dingjian 2009). So the wage increase should be 
supported by the administrative reform that only those who are competent remain, those 
who do not reach the standard should be cleared out so that the government can be 
efficient and clean. 
 
Third, when fighting against corruption, it was discovered that the lower–leveled 
officials in the government have more opportunities in reducing the rate of corruption 
from being happening, but lack the stimulation to do so, and the senior officials, on the 
contrary, have more stimulation but less opportunities (Cai Dingjian 2009). So the 
increasing of wage as a stimulation to the middle or low–leveled officials to resist the 
corruption is theoretically doable. Another step is concerned with the welfare, such as 
pension or margin or any kind of insurance that was guaranteed with the position one 
holds. The measure of taking away all the job related welfare of the officers who are 
detected of having the corruptive behaviors would make corruption a much riskier 
activity to conduct for government officers when facing the lure of corruption which in 
turn would reduce the chances of them being corrupted.  
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We have discussed the reason why some people think that the ―high salary‖ approach 
can be adopted in China and how to initiate the first moves, now it is the time to discuss 
whether it is a smart move.   
 
The respect of human nature as economically motivated is the strong point as well as 
drawback of the approach of nourishing a clean government by high salary. It is true 
that the approach is humane enough to respect that all human have the right to pursue 
the maximum interest, but if we just indulge people to do so, keep on fulfilling people‘s 
material needs, there could never be an end to this need. Though we try to convince 
ourselves that human are naturally moral and humble, it is unrealistic and often in vain 
to think that by preaching morality and conscience or by imposing the pressure of being 
publicly criticized, we can transform the never satisfying economic man into the 
selfless, dedicated ―moral model‖ who can fight the greediness, the desire of wanting 
more rooted within by knowing when to stop.  
 
Like the black hole in the space that is so powerful that nothing, not even the light can 
escape from it when passing by, the economic nature of human is somewhat like it with 
strong gravitational field of greed in the centre that no matter how many things it 
captures, there would never be a day that it could be fulfilled completely. There are 
always more things to have, more money to get, more power to hold. From the human 
perspective, selfishness, profligacy and greed are in our genes and cannot be eradicated, 
but only curbed by laws or other institutionalized rational powers. Simply put, if we 
hope to put an end to corruption only by offering more money, it is naïve and even 
absurd to believe that people‘s moral character and conscience will be inspired by this 
mean solely that it would eventually overcome the selfish desires and restrain the 
obediently hand over the illegal gains. 
 
Besides, the approach is not broadly supported by the masses of people in China, 
especially the under–developed people in the remote regions. The National Bureau of 
Statistics issued a report showing that by the end of the year 2006, there were 
approximately 0.577 billion people who lived in the city of main land China and about 
0.737 billion rural population, among which there were over 23.65 million people still 
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living in absolute poverty with annual income less than 683 RMB per person. China 
ranks 104 of the average per capita gross domestic product ranking in 2007 though its 
ranking of world GDP is the third place which indicates that the majority of Chinese 
population is still struggling for food and clothing.  
 
Although the living conditions of those who live in the rural area have increased 
dramatically over the past 30 years of development, there still are a lot of problems 
concerning their social security system such as pension and health care. Under the 
circumstances mentioned above, it is extremely unacceptable and unfair for those who 
barely have the money to feed their families to agree to apply the high salary policy to 
those who already have redundant resources only in the sense of making them do their 
job while maintaining clean and honest. I believe that only after the quality and the 
living standards of the entire nation are improved can the theory of high salary for clean 
government be truly accepted by people and function well when applied in China. 
(China Popin 2007.) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
As one the countries in the world that have a clean government, there is no doubt that 
Singapore has found the right way to battle with corruption. This right way consists of a 
comprehensive legal system, the check and balance of power, a professional and 
independent law enforcement institution and so on. The Singaporean success of curbing 
corruption and building a clean government is no miracle. Through a combination of the 
above mentioned factors, Singapore figured out its own unique way to fight against 
corruption according to the historical conditions, current administrative system and 
condition of the country that formed Singapore. By looking into the nature of the 
Singaporean experience and the corruption theory about the causation of corruption, we 
can see that Singapore succeeded in containing corruption and building the clean 
government because they have a conscious perception with full awareness of the source 
where corruption stems from, and with this full awareness, they constructed the 
corresponding countermeasure. 
 
Corruption is more likely to flourish in an organization that does not have a wide range 
of rules, regulations or policies that guide employees in their work. Similarly, a country 
must have clear policies and legislation that guide the behavior of all its people 
including the public servants. However, without a reasonable balance in terms of 
policies and legislation, corruption would find fertile ground in a country that has 
numerous laws, rules and regulations. 
 
Singapore enacted Prevention of Corruption Act and Corruption, Drug Trafficking and 
Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act as the leading legislation of anti–
corruption. Beside these two, there are also laws and regulations that regulate the 
behavior of civil servants. Singapore put a lot of efforts on constructing a strict and rigid 
legal system. Together with intensive supervision power and severe punishment 
measures, they have formed a relatively complete legal system. Through practices over 
the time, the amendments of the laws and regulations are constantly formulated and 
enacted which ensure the co–development of the legal system through time in 
correspondence with the changing national and international environment. By doing so, 
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the corruption is always controlled within the certain framework and the chance that 
corruption would come back in Singapore is reduced to the minimum.  
 
The situation in China is quite complicated. As introduced before, the Chinese 
government as well as its leaders in different times always considered corruption as the 
most urgent matter to be dealt with after the establishment of New China. In Mao‘s 
time, he emphasized the importance of anti–corruption, and launched several campaigns 
against corruption that did have a short–period of effectiveness, but it did not occur to 
him that the strict and comprehensive legislation system is the fundamental stepping 
point of anti–corruption. Deng Xiaoping, after taking over the power in the country and 
the Party from Mao, was too caught up by the idea of developing the economy of the 
nation.  
 
He did a splendid job on boosting China‘s economy and creating a better livelihood for 
the people, but by doing so, the anti–corruption was often compromised. In his theory, 
the principal is to promote reform and opening up to the outside world and at the same 
time strengthen the construction of the legal system in the process of fighting against 
corruption and anti–corruption should always be conducted on the basis of economical 
construction.  Though Deng realized the importance of strengthening and completing 
the construction of legal system to fight against corruption, the fact is that the legal 
provision regarding corruption can be found in the Criminal Law of People‘s republic of 
China and other laws and regulations, China till now still do not have specialized and 
professional anti–corruption laws.  
 
Corruption is also commonly found where there is no transparency in an organization, if 
the one organization‘s tasks and functions are conducted in secret and are not open to 
examination by other government officers or the public, the opportunity for corruption 
increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for democracy in which sovereignty is vested 
in the people and the conduct of civil servants must be open to examination. 
 
Singapore does a god job on this issue as well. The government and its organizations as 
well as the laws and regulations are informatized with the open websites that its tasks 
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and functions and performances are accessible for the public to inspect and supervise. 
Also, ―press responsibility‖ is emphasized in Singapore and the media is seen as the 
important part of nation–building instead of checks and balances on political power. 
The government does not directly interfere with the operations of media. When 
accusations are made by the media towards government issues, the government does not 
block, bury or silence the media who made the accusations, but actively exposes and 
fully discloses the problem to the public. If the accusation is authentic, it is often dealt 
with strictly and publicly, if it is not, detailed explanations are giving to the public as 
well. 
 
In China, things are different. China does have open websites of the government and 
some of the organizations, however, the information that is open for people to review 
and check is often selected. The whole truth is seldom revealed to the public. Besides, it 
is not secret in China that the government controls the media in the name of stabilizing 
the society by blocking troublesome information. As to what kind of information is 
considered dangerous that could threaten the order of the society and to what extent 
should the public be informed with the government issues still remain unknown, not 
only to the people but also to the government itself. 
  
The internal or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of corruption or that 
act on complaints relating to corruption is vital for they are responsible for making 
corruption a high risk activity. If such institutions are missing, people may take 
advantage of the fact that the chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote, 
and corruption would be unstoppable.  
 
The famous CPIB in Singapore is one of the watchdog institutions. It is so powerful and 
effective on fighting against corruption that it is considered one of the most valuable 
experiences of anti–corruption that may benefit other countries if adopted well. 
 
China took this experience into practice and built anti–corruption bureaus within the 
procuratorial system at all levels. The Chinese anti–corruption bureau is useful in 
fighting against corruption in China but the result is not as impressive as CPIB. And 
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because of the non–transparent tradition of Chinese government, most people do not 
have a clear concept of its functions and operational approaches. Another reason that the 
Chinese anti–corruption bureau is not very successful is because it is not as independent 
as CPIB.     
 
Just as Caiden and Gould suggested respectively in their studies, in order to curb 
corruption effectively, the combination of the following should be assured before any 
expected anti−corruption results appears: codes that construct trustworthy leadership 
and the public servants‘ integrity; tougher laws and enforcement; Systemic, Structural, 
and Policy Change; a free press; an anti−corruption Agency; a transparent government 
and so on. The answer to the question of why Singapore succeeded and China failed can 
be drawn from above. Singapore, as analyzed before, possess most of the acquired 
factors. China, on the other hand, is not.      
 
Beside the CPIB, what the Chinese call the approach of high salary nourishing a clean 
government is another experience that China is thinking of adopting because some 
people believe that there is a positive connection between the high salary of the 
Singapore public servants and the world‘s top clean government that Singapore is 
having. Reason of why people think that high salary can lead to clean government is 
that corruption can be attributed to the low salaries of civil servants.  
 
It may be true that it is more difficult to stay honest, hard–working and trustworthy on a 
low salary, but it is also true that most people with low salaries are still able to do so 
and that many corrupt officials are people in high, responsible positions, earning good 
salaries. In conjunction, corrupt practices flourish in systems where employees have 
high job security; where the level of professionalism in the public service is low; and 
hence officials rather serve their own interests than perform their duty to serve the 
public. Singapore government uses the high salary as a measure to attract talents to 
serve in the government and the country, not as a means to keep people from being 
corrupted. Thus, if China still wishes to apply the high salary approach, the changes of 
the civil servant system and the legal system should be achieved beforehand so that the 
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high salary will be seen as an incentive for public servants to be free of corruption 
instead of the reason to be corrupted because they want more.                          
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